NEW DELHI MUNTCIPAL COMMITTEE versus ALLIED MOTORS PVT LTD. AND ORS.

Citation: [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 427 · Decided: 17-10-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. PUNCHHI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

NEW DELHI MUNTCIPAL COMMITTEE 
A 
F. 
ALLIED MOTORS PVT LTD. AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 17, 1995 
!MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.j 
B 
Punjab Mu11icipal Act, 1911: Sectiom 18/l(v) and 199. 
New Delhi Mu11icipal Commi1te<:-Bye-law.1~Adve1tisement Tax--Bye-
law !-Clause (a) of Bye-law 7 (as it stood p1ior lo 19.2.71)-Name C 
board-Exemptio11 from adve1tisemenl tax if displayed by trader on its own 
prenlises and docs not contain any iteni of adve1tiscment-Conzpany canying 
on sale purchase and repair of nzotor vehicles-Exhibition of neon signs on 
its premises-Held not e11titled to exemption under Bye-law 7(a). 
Words & Phrases-'Name board'-Mea11ing of-Gause 7(a) of NDMC D 
Bye-laws. 
The appellant-Committee raised demand for advertisement tax 
against the respondent-Company as the latter had exhibited neon signs on 
its premises viz. 'Allied Motor Private Ltd.', 'Perkings', 'R.R', 'Bedford', 
'Lambretta', 'Burshane' and 'Gaskets'. The respondent-Company unsuc-
cessfully challenged the levy before a Single Judge of the High Court which 
held that the Board displayed by the respondents were in the nature of 
advertisements. However, the letters Patent Bench of the High Court 
allowed the respondents' appeal by holding that the boards displayed by 
the respondents' were purely name boards, containing no item of adver-
tisement except the trade name of the articles suggested to be offered for 
sale, and therefore entitled to exemption from advertisement tax under 
clause (a) of Bye-law 7. 
E 
F 
Allowing the appeal preferred by the New Delhi Municipal Commit- G 
tee and setting aside the impugned Judgment, this Court 
HELD : 1. The demand or advertisement tax is upheld. If the act 
attracting taxation does not come \Vi thin the scope of 'advertisement' within 
the meaning of Qye-law 1, the question of providing under Bye-law 7 any. 
exemption from payment of tax on exempted advertisements does not arise. H 
427 
428 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A 
But if the act comes within the scope or advertisement, um1uestionably and 
undeniably, then alone can resort he had to Rye·lau· 7 to discover whether 
the advertisement is such as to which any exemption can he attracted. It is 
plain therefore, that it shall initially be an advertisement but would be 
exempted from taxation if' (i) it is displayed by a tr.1der, (ii) on his own 
B 
pretnises, (iii) purely as a nan1e board as such and (iv) on purity n1ain~ 
tained by not containing any other item or advertisement. [ 432-D-EJ 
2. The expression 'na1ne board' is apparently a tern1 of art, tinding 
its way to the alleys of' law by subordinate legislation. It would be causing 
violence to the spirit of' Clause (a) of Bye-law 7, in splitting the expression 
C 'name board' into two separate words i.e. name and board and depleting 
the provision of its intent. Even though under Clause (a) of Bye-law 7 two 
words, i.e., 'name' and 'board' are used in succession, what is intended to 
mean is that these go to make one word or a combined w.ord, in order to 
exempt advertisement by displaying of the name board by the trader on 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
his own premises, provided the board is purely a name board and does 
not contain any item of advertisement. Significantly, in the in-built proviso, 
the word 'name board' in its pristine purity, reflects something more than 
a board and in that manner distinctive. This adds to the analysis that the 
words 'name' and 'board' are not separate so as to be given separate 
meanings and then coalescing them up. The identifying name so displayed 
pertains to the place or object, not to the name of the trade or the owner. 
A name board thus plays the part of the identifier, if the place/premises 
has a name, by display of such name. If by means of paint or structural 
signs an identifying name is engrafted over a building, as an identffying 
measure, then it is a name board because becoming a part of the premises· 
it makes the premises self introductory by name. (433-D-H, 434-A] 
The Random House Dictionmy of the English Language; Webster's 
T71ird New lntenzational Dictio11a1)i, referred to. 
3. The case of the respondents being that they use neon lights to 
display the names of com1nodities they sell would fall since those adver-
tisements cannot be called name-boards or even as identifying the name 
of' any object in which the trader was doing his business that being barely 
descriptive of the commodity. It would be more apt to say that t

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.