NEMI CHAND AND ANOTHER versus THE EDWARD MILLS CO. LTD. AND OTHERS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
,+ . . S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 197 rights to file the suit in ejectment in the City Ci vi! Court and that Court had J. urisdiction to entertain 1952 Bhatia the suit and to pass the decree that it did. • co-operativa The result, therefore, is that we allow this appeal, Housing Society set aside the judgment and decree of the High Cou-rt Ltd. and restore the decree passed by the City Ci vii Court. v. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout in D. c. Patel. all Courts. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant: P. G. Gokhale. Agent for the respondent: S. P. Varma . • NEMI CHAND AND ANOTHER v. THE EDWARD MILLS CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER /· [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.] Court-Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12-Givil Procedure Gode, 1908, s. 2(ii), 0. VII, r. 11-Decision as to court-fee-Finality- Scope of s. 12-Dismissal for non-payment of court-fee-Power of appellate Court to c011sider whether decision abo·ut court-fee was right - Declaratory suit with prayer for conseqne11tial relief-Appeal giving up prayer for conseq1iential relief-J.Iaintainability-Gonrt- Dqs J, 1952 Nov. 10. ,,_ fee. - + In a plaint the following reliefs were asked for, viz., (i) that it be declared that the appointment of defendant No. 2 as chairman of the board of directors of a company is illegal, invalid and ultra vires and that he has no right to act as chairman, managing director etc., and (ii) that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the management of the company. The plaint bore a court-fee stamp of Rs. 10 only but, on the objection of the defendants, ad valorem fee was paid on Rs. 51,000 which was the valuation of the suit. The suit was dismissed and the plaintiff preferred an appeal giving up the second relief and paying a court-fee of Rs. 10 only. The ll.lll\Bllate Court ordered payment of ad valorem court-fee and on non-compliance rejected the memorandum of appeal. On further appeal; · ~I! 1962 Nemi Chand and Another v. The Mdward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another. 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] Held, (i) that it was open to the appellant to give up the second relief in appeal and, a.s the subject-matter of the appeal "'aS of a purely declaratory nature, the memorandum of appeal \Vas Properly stamped; (ii) that the first relief was of a purely declaratory nature and did not involve any consequential relief; (iii) that s. 12 of the Court-Fees Act did not preclude the Court from considering the correctness of the orUer o:f the lower appellate court rejecting the appeal On the ground that the me1no- randum. of appeal \Vas not properly stamped. The finality imposed by s. 12 of the Court-Fees Act on deci- sions relating to court-fee attaches only to decisions concerning valUation simpliciter; it does not attach to decisions relating to the category under '\Vhich a suit or appeal falls for purposes of court-fees. Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act when it says that such a decision shall be final between the parties only makes the .Jeci- sion o:f the court on a question of court-fee non-appealable and places it on the same footing as other interlocutory non-appealable orders under the Code and does no more than that. If a decision under s. 12 is reached by assuming jurisdiction \\'hich the court does not possess or without ohRerving the formalities which are prescribed fbr reaching such a decision, the order obviously would be revisable by the High Court in the exercise of revisional po,vers. Similarly, V·lhen a party thinking that a decision under s. 12 is palpably wrong takes the risk of his plaint being rejected or suit dismissed and then appeals from the order rejecting the plaint or from the decree disn_iissing the suit but not from the decision on the question of court-fee, then it is open to him. to challenge the interlocutory order even on the question of court-fee in the suit 01· appeal. . The word "finality" construed in the limited sense in which it is often used in statutes means that no appeal lies from an order of this character as such and it means no more than that. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.105of1950. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated March 22, 1945, of the Court of the Judicial C~mmissioner, Ajmer-Merwara, Ajmer (Davies J.C.) in Civil First Appeal No. 16 of 1944, arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated March 13, 1944, of the Court of the Judge, Small Causes, Ajm
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex