NAZAR SINGH AND ORS. versus JAGJIT KAUR AND ORS.
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A NAZAR SINGH AND ORS. v. JAGJIT KAUR AND ORS. , NOVEMBER 13, 1995 B [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Section 14. Female Hindu-Right to hold prope1ty-Absolute ownership-Husband C and wife-Compromise deed /Jetween--Reshictive covenants-Grant of land to wife in lieu of maintenance after commencement of the Act-Held wife became absolute owner notwithstanding restrictive covenants-Section 14( 1) held applicable-Section 14(2) held not applicable-When properties are acquired in lieu of maintenance. D H got possession of 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land from her E F husband G in lieu of maintenance under a compromise deed dated Decem· ber 3, 1963 which contained several restrictive covenants. Subsequent to the death of her husband she sold 70 kanals and 19 marlas of land to defendants-appellants. G's second wife and her three daughters filed a suit claiming Vflth share in the suit land sold to the appellants on the ground that H was entitled to only 11!th share in the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit by holding that (i) the compromise deed created only a life estate in favour of H and not the absolute estate; (ii) sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was applicable to the case and not sub-section (1). The judgment of the Trial Court was affirmed by the first as well as the second appellate court. Allowing defendants-appellants' appeal and setting aside the im· pugned judgment, this Court HELD : 1. The suit lands given to H by her husband in lieu of her G maintenance were held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. The Courts below were in error in holding that because the com· promise whereunder the said lands were given to H towards her main- tenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section (1) of H Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not attracted and that it 162 NAZAR SINGH v. JAGJIT KAUR [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.) 163 is sub-section (2) that is attracted. (167-A-B; 168-C] (2) According to sub-section (1) where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the Act, such property becomes her absolute property on the commencement A B of the Act provided the said property was "possessed" by her. Where, however, the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limita- tions and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the C words used in sub-section (1). Though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession. Therefore, the suit lands became the absolute property of H the moment D she was placed in possession thereof. Consequently the respondent· plaintitrs suit must fail. [167-C-F] V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCC 99; Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, (1987] 2 SCC 572 and Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi, [1995] 6 sec 88, relied on. E Gumpha v. Jaibai, (1994] 2 SCC 511, distinguished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10339 of 1995. From the Order dated the 9th February, 1995 of the H;gh Court of Pb. and Haryana at Chandigarh in RS.A. No. 2598/94 Maninder Singh for the Appellant. F G P.S. Mahendra, B.S. Oberoi and Rohit Luthra for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties. H 164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the B c Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by the defendants-appellants. The suit for "possession of the land (suit lands) to the extent of 7/gth share" has been decreed by the Trial Court and affirmed in appeal and second appeal. Gurdial Singh was a resident of a village in Bhatinda district in Punjab. He owned 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land in the village. He was working as
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