NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS. versus UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE
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A B C D E F G H 379 NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ] 379 [2018] 7 S.C.R. 379 NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016) SEPTEMBER 06, 2018 [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, R. F. NARIMAN, A. M. KHANWILKAR, DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 β s.377 β Constitutionality of β Held: s.377, so far as it criminalises even consensual sexual acts between competent adults, fails to make a distinction between non-consensual and consensual sexual acts of competent adults in private space which are neither harmful nor contagious to the society β s.377 subjects the LGBT community to societal pariah and dereliction and is, therefore, manifestly arbitrary, for it has become an odious weapon for the harassment of the LGBT community by subjecting them to discrimination and unequal treatment β Therefore, s.377 is liable to be partially struck down for being violative of Art.14 of the Constitution β In other words, s.377, so far as it penalizes any consensual sexual activity between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) and lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional β However, if anyone, both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of s.377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under s.377 β Any act of the description covered under s.377 done between the individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under s.377 β Constitution of India β Art.14 β Homosexual β LGBT. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Penal Code, 1860 β s.377 β Expression βagainst the order of natureβ β The expression βagainst the order of natureβ has neither been defined in s.377 nor in any other provision of the IPC β The connotation given to the expression by various judicial A B C D E F G H 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 7 S.C.R. pronouncements includes all sexual acts which are not intended for the purpose of procreation β Therefore, if coitus is not performed for procreation only, it does not per se make it βagainst the order of natureβ. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Penal Code, 1860 β s.377 β Examination of s.377 on the anvil of Art.14 of the Constitution β Held: The classification adopted under s.377 has no reasonable nexus with its object as other penal provisions such as s.375 and the POCSO Act already penalize non- consensual carnal intercourse β s.377, insofar as it applies to same- sex consenting adults, demeans them by having them prosecuted instead of understanding their sexual orientation and attempting to correct centuries of the stigma associated with such persons β s.377 offends Art.14 as it discriminates between heterosexual and homosexual adults which is a distinction which has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Section - namely, the criminalization of all carnal sex between homosexual and/or heterosexual adults as being against the order of nature β Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity give further content to the fundamental rights contained in Arts 14, 15, 19 and 21, and in the light of these principles also, s.377 is unconstitutional. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.) Penal Code, 1860 β s.377 β Examination of s.377 on the anvil of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution β Held: s.377 amounts to an unreasonable restriction, for public decency and morality cannot be amplified beyond a rational or logical limit and cannot be accepted as reasonable grounds for curbing the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and choice of the LGBT community β Consensual carnal intercourse among adults, be it homosexual or heterosexual, in private space, does not in any way harm the public decency or morality β Therefore, s.377 in its present form violates Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Penal Code, 1860 β s.377 β Miniscule population of LGBT β The mere fact that the percentage of population whose fundamental right to privacy is being abridged by the existence of s.377 in its present form is low does not impose a limitation upon the Constitutional court from protecting the fundamental rights of those A B C D E F G H 381 NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI T
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