NAVEEN CHANDRA versus STATE OF UTTRANCHAL
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A B NA VEEN CHANDRA v. STATEOFUlTRANCHAL NOVEMBER 27, 2006 [ARIJIT PASA Y AT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANT A, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 34, Exception I and 4 to Section 300 and Section 304 Part I: C Murder-Accused and deceased are relatives-Rivarly between them- Provocation-Deceased injured and later succumbed to injuries-Right to self defence and Exception 4 to Section 300-Applicability of-Trial Court found accused persons guilty of committing offence of murder and convicted them uls. 302 rlw s. 34 !PC and awarded death sentence-High Court D altering death sentence into life imprisonment as against accused-appellant, acquitting other two accused persons-On appeal, Held: A quarrel sudden or not, must necessarily depend upon proved facts of each case-For claiming application of Exception 4 to Section 300 besides showing that there was sudden quarrel and no pre-meditation-It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner- E Applying the legal principles to the facts and circumstances of the case, inevitable conclusion is that Exception 4 to Section 300 does not apply-- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s. 366. Penal Code 1860-ss. 96 to 105-Right to private defence- App/icabi/ity of-Held: Accused need not prove the existence of the right of F private defence beyond reasonable doubt-He is required to show that preponderance of probabilities in favour of such plea-It should not be based on surmise and speculations-Entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper prospective-It is exactly a defensive right available, only when the circumstances clearly justify it-it should not be G allowed to be availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose-A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive when need to defend no longer survive-Applying the legal principles to the facts and circumstances of the case, inevitable conclusion is that the accused persons had exceeded the right of private defense by continuing the attacks H 668 ..... ... NA VEEN CHANDRA v. ST ATE OF UTTRANCHAL 669 even after the threat to life had ceased-Hence provisions of Section 304 A Part-I attracted-Conviction is altered accordingly from death sentence to ten years imprisonment-Directions issued-Evidence Act, 1872-s. 105. Accused-appellant was convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 34 of the Act for committing murder of his relatives, 3 persons of a family. Trial Court awarded B death sentence to accused-appellant and life imprisonment to other two accused persons/parents of accused. A reference was made to High Court for confirmation of the award of death sentence in terms of Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court directed acquittal of parents of accused and converted death sentence awarded to accused into life imprisonment. Hence the present appeal. C . Respondent-State submitted that the High Court was rather liberal in altering the death sentence to life imprisonment and had rightly turned down the plea of grave and sudden provocation or the occurrence taking place in course of sudden quarrel or in exercise of right of private defence. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court D HELD:l.1. Fourth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception_, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence E of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception F 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor
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