LexNATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD. versus JAMES CHADVICK & BROS. LTD.
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• 1028 SUPREME COURT HEFORTS [1953] 1953 c:liscretion of the courts below in re.(using to grant ,, d--L '· relief against forfeiture . ..L\ ani ea 011.'m,an Lodhi The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is v. dismissed with costs. NaNnadabai an;d Others. 1953 Ma,y 7. Appeal dismissed. Agent for appellant: R. A. Govind. Agent for respondents: Rajinder Narain. NATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD. v. JAMES CHADvVICK & BROS. LTD. (J. & P. COATS LTD., Assignee) REGISTHAR OF THADE MAHKS-Intervener. [MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.] Trade Marks Act, 1940, ss. 8, 76-Application for registration of trade mark -Dismissal by Registrar -Appeal to High Co11rt- Jttdgment of Single Jnd.ge--TVhether appealable to Division Bench- Lettcrs Patent (Bombay), cl. 15--Government of India Act, 1915, s. ZOS-Constit11tion of India, 1950, s. 226-Power of Registrar w reject application if nirirk is likely to deceive ot cause confusion- Decision in passina ofl action, whether conclitisivc. Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, provides that an appeal shall lie from any decision of the Registrar under the Act or the rules made thereunder, to the High Court having jurisdic- tion, but the Act did not make any provision with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeal or as to whether the order of bhe High Court was appealable: Held, that the High Court had to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under s. 76 of the Act in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction, and \vhen such jurisdiction was exercised by a Single Judge, his judgment was appealable under cl. 15 of the l~etters Patent. National Televhone Co. v. Postmaster General ([l 913] A.C. 546), R. M.A. R. A. Adaikavva Chettiar v. Ra. Chandrasekham Thevor (74 I.A. 264), Secretary of State v. Chellikani Ram'" Rao (I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617) referred to. The power conferred by s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, on tbe High Courts, of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by Single Judges or by Divisio~ Courts could be exercised not only in respect to such jurisdiction , s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1029 as the High Court~ possessed when the Act of 1016 came into 1933 force but also in respect of jurisdictions conferred on the High -- Court by subsequent legislation, e.g., s. 76 of the Trade :\larks Act . .Vational Sewing Coder the rules of construction enunciated in s. 8 of the Thread Go. Ltd. Genernl Clauses Act and s. 38 of the Interpretation Act, which v. . are of general application, the reference to s. 108 of the Govern· Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915, in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent should, awl Bros. Ltd. after the enactment of the Constitution of 1950, be read as refer- ence to the corresponding provisions of art. 225 of the Constitu- tion. The ambit of the power conferred on the High Courts by s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is not limited by s. 106(1) of the said Act or by cl. 16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. Indian Electric Works v. RIJ!listrar of Trade Marks (A.LR. 194 7 Cal. 49) overruled. Secretary of State v. Jlask & Co. (67 I.A. 222) and the Gttr- dwara Case (63 I.A. 180) distinguished. The respondents, a company registered in England, manu- factured sewing thread with the device of an Eagle with outspread wings kno\vn as the "Eagle l\fark" as their trade mark, and since 1896 this thread was being sold in the Indian markets on an ex- Lensi \'e scale. The appellants, a company registered in India, began in 1940 to sell sewing thread with the device of a bird resembling an eagle with wings fully spread out with the words "Eagle Brand" as their mark. On the objection of the respond- ents the appellants subsequently changed the name to "Vulture Brand" without changing the mark in other respects. The res- pondents instituted an action against the appellants for passing off, but that was dismissed. The appellants subsequently applied for registration of their trade mark but their application was dis- missed by the Registrar on the ground that the appellants' mark so nearly resembled the respondents' mark as to be likely to deceive the public and cause confusion. This order was reversed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay but restored on appeal by a Division Bench: Held (i) that the judgment of the Division Bench upholding the order of the Regist
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