NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. versus AJIT KUMAR AND ORS.
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NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. AJIT KUMAR AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 2, 2003 A [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Sections 2(14), 2(35), 2(40), 2(47), 145(c), 147-'Goods Carriage '-Person traveling in goods carriage as passenger-Death or bodily injury-Liability of insurer-Held, insurer not liable-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-Sections 2(8), 2(25), 2(29), 2(33). C The only question involved in the appeals in whether insurer is liable to pay compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for death of or bodily injury to the person traveling in a goods vehicle as passenger. The Tribunal and the High Court relying on the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, fixed liability on the insurer. D Hence, these appeals by the insurer. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD : 1.1. Provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 do not E enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger traveling in a goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefor. [326-D) New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Asha Rani and Ors., [2003) 2 SCC 223, followed. F Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd v. Devireddy Konda Reddy and Ors., [2003) 2 sec 339, relied on. 1.2. In Satpal Singh 's case this Court proceeded on the footing that provision of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are in pari G materia with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to the amendment in 1994. There are conceptual differences in the expressions "goods vehicle", "public service vehicle", "stage carrier", "transport vehicle" occurring in Sections 2(8), 2(25), 2(29),_2(33) of the 1939 Act with the corresponding provisions i.e. Sections 2(14), 2(35), H 321 322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A 2(40) and 2(47) of the 1988 Act The difference in the language of "goods vehicle" as appearing in the 1939 Act and "goods carriage" in the 1988 Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression" in addition B to passengers" as contained in definition of"goods vehicle" in the 1939 Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used in "goods carriage" is "solely for the carriage of goods" Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the 1988 Act. [323-E-G, 325-H, 326-A, BJ C New India Assurance Co. ltd v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237, explained and distinguished. 1.3. There is no provision similar to clause (ii) of the proviso appended to Section 95 of the 1939 Act prescribing requirement of D insurance policy. Even Section 147 of the 1988 Act mandates compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any person of "public service vehicle". The proviso makes it further clear that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. There is no reference E to any passenger in "goods carriage". (326-B, C[ CIVIL APPELLATE WRISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6915- 6916 of 2003. From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.2002 of the Madhya F Pradesh High Court in F.A. No. 421 and 422 of 2001. Kishore Rawat and M.K. Dua for the Appellant. Dr. Kailash Chand and Durgesh Shrimali for the Respondents. G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : Leave granted. The only question raised in these appeals is whether the insurer is liable to pay the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in H short the 'Act') for the death or bodily injury to a person traveling in goods NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. AJITKUMAR [PASAYAT, J) 323 vehicle as passenger. Liability of the insurer was fixed by relying on this A Court's decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpa/ Singh, [2000) 1 sec 237. Factual aspects need not be gone into in detail, as there is practically no dispute on the factual aspects. Learned counsel for the insurer-appellant submitted that Section 149 B (2) of the Act is etymologically different from proviso (ii) to Section 96 (2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'old Act') and, therefore, the ratio in Satpal Singh 's case (supra) has no application. In response, learned counsel appearing for the claimants
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