NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION versus PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1973] 1 S.C.R. 40 · Decided: 29-03-1972 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.K. MITTER · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

40 
NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 
v. 
PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS 
March 29, 1972 
A 
[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 
B 
industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Scope af-'Work-
.111an', if includes une }Vhose services have been terminated. 
The respondent, an employee of the appellant was suspended and 
the suspension remained in force till the date of his dismissal. 
He ap-
plied to the Labour Court under s. 33C{2) of the Jndrutrial Disputes 
Act, 1947, for computation of the benefits and amounts he was entitled 
C 
to receive during the period of suspemion, and the Labour Court decided 
• f 
.in his favour. 
On the question whether the section can be invoked by a dismissed 
workman in respect of benefits and salary due to him for the perioC 
prior tc the date of dismissal, 
HELD: The suo-section provides that where any workman is entitled 
to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable 
of being computed in terms of money and if any question· arises as to 
the amount due, then the question may be decided by the appropriate 
'Labour Court. 
The definition of 'workman' in s. 2(s) of the Act in-
cludes within its fold, only, for the purpose of a proceeding ur.der the 
Act in <elation to an industrial dispute. persons who have been dismissed, 
.discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that 
dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that 
dispute. 
The definitivn specifically excludes from its 
purvie•v 
four-
catcgo'ries of perrnns •omployed in an industry, who would have otherwise 
been wit'1in the periphery of the definition. 
But, because the definition 
'includes only specified types of 
dismissed, 
discharged or retrenched 
·workmen 
for 
limited 
purposes 
and 
expressly 
excludes 
certain 
·categories of persons, it cannot, on that account, be contended that the 
definition is precise and exact and cannot be extendod to other dismissed, 
discharged or retr.enched workmen, whose claim I'equiring computation 
'is in respect of an existing right arising out of his relationship as an in-
.dustrial workman of his employer. 
[501!-E, 5JA.(:J 
The definition section begins with the clause, 'unless there is anything 
repugnant in thr.;!. subject or context.' The context and the subject matter 
are accordingly important factors. because, all parts of the Act have to 
be in harmony with the statutory intent. The object of enacting the 
section \vas to enable individual \vorkmen to implement, enforce or exe-
cute their existing individual rights against their employers without bein~ 
compelled to have· :r.ecourse to s. 10 by raisin~ disputes and securing a 
reference which is obviously a lengthy process. It clothes the Labour 
Court with powers ·similar to those of an exeduting court so that the con-
o!rncd workman eets speedv relief. It therefore calls fclr a broad and 
'beneficial construction, consistent with the other provisions of the Act, 
which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mi•chief. 
The mischief which the section was designed to suppress was the difficulty 
·faced by individual workmen in getting reliet in ·respect of their existirig 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
0 
E 
F 
G 
N.B.C.C. v. P. s. GILL. (Dua, J.) 
41 
rights without ha•ing resort to s. 10 of the Act. 
Therefore, the term 
'workman' as used in the 
sub-section must include all persons whose 
claim, requiring compuation under the sub-section, is in respect of Qll 
existing right arising from his relationshiP' as an industrial workman with 
his empley.ir. Otherwise, it would always be open to an unfair, unsym-
pathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his em-
ployee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by the section 
and .compel hiril to have reso'rt to th,e lengthy procedure by way of re-
ferenc-~ •under s. 10, the{J:by defeating the very purpose and object of 
enacting the 
provi~ion. [51E-A, 52CA-El 
Chief Mining Engineer, Eost In:dia Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar & 
Ors. [196&] 1 S.C.R. 140, UP. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla, 
Al.R. 1970 S.C. 237, R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. 
lhe Labour Court, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451 and Bennl!t Coltman 
& Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, 
[1970] 
1 S.C.R. 
131, 
referred to. 
Central 
Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopa/an, f1964] 3 S.C.R. 
140 
and Ke.1>oram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809, distin-
~u

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