NATHU SINGH versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

Citation: [2021] 6 S.C.R. 599 · Decided: 28-05-2021 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.V. RAMANA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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599
NATHU SINGH
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 522 of 2021)
MAY 28, 2021
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT AND
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.438 – Anticipatory bail
– Propriety of protective order after dismissal of anticipatory bail
application – High Court while dismissing anticipatory bail
application of the respondents-accused granted them 90 days to
surrender before trial court to seek regular bail and granted them
protection from coercive action for the said period – Aggrieved by
such relief, instant appeal filed by the complainant – Held: A Court,
be it a Sessions Court or a High Court, in certain special facts and
circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited
period of time – The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so,
which would be assailable before a superior Court – In granting
the relief for a period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not
considered the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant
or the proviso under s.438(1) which necessitates that the Court pass
such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest
duration that is reasonably required – A period of 90 days, or three
months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in
the instant facts and circumstances – The resultant effect of the
High Court’s orders is that neither are the respondents found entitled
to pre-arrest bail, nor can they be arrested for a long duration –
During the said duration, they can roam freely without being
apprehensive of coercive action – Thus, High Court committed a
grave error in passing such protection to the respondents-accused
– Such a direction by the High Court exceeded its judicial discretion
and would amount to judicial largesse, which the Courts do not
possess.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal has
authoritatively held that when a Court grants anticipatory bail
[2021] 6 S.C.R. 599
599
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 6 S.C.R.
under Section 438, Cr.P.C., the same is ordinarily not limited to a
fixed period and would subsist till the end of the trial. However,
it was clarified by the Court that if the facts and circumstances so
warranted, the Court could impose special conditions, including
limiting the relief to a certain period. However, in these appeals,
the High Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations
against the respondents, rejected the application of the
respondents-accused. It is after rejecting the application that the
High Court chose fit to grant some relief to the respondents while
directing them to surrender before the Trial Court to file a regular
bail application within 90 days, by protecting them from any
coercive action during that period. [Paras 14, 16][605-D-E, H;
606-A]
Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC
1 : [2020] 2 SCR 1 – relied on.
2.1 The focus of Section 438, Cr.P.C., when read in its
entirety, clearly relates to the grant of anticipatory bail by the
Court. Section 438(1) explicitly lays down certain factors that need
to be considered by the Court before granting the relief sought.
Section 438(2) lays down the conditions that may be imposed by
the Court while granting the relief. Section 438(3) dictates the
consequences of the grant of relief under the Section. The only
guidance relating to what is to take place once an application
under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is rejected is found in the proviso to
Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which specifically provides that once an
application is rejected, or the Court seized with the matter refuses
to issue an interim order, it is open to the police to arrest the
applicant. [Paras 18, 19][607-B-D]
2.2 Any interpretation of the provisions of Section 438,
Cr.P.C. has to take into consideration the fact that the grant or
rejection of an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. has a direct
bearing on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual.
The genesis of this jurisdiction lies in Article 21 of the
Constitution, as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty
of an individual. The provision therefore needs to be read liberally,
and considering its beneficial nature, the Courts must not read
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in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly
provided for. Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in

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