NATHI DEVI versus RADHA DEVI GUPTA
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NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA DECEMBER 17, 2004 [N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.] Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 : A B Section 14D-Eviction-Right to immediate possession by a Widow- C Pre existent tenant-Held, not available to transferee widow landlady. Interpretation of Statutes : Court-Interpretative function-To find out the true legislative intent-"- D Every word used by the legislature be given effect to--Object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. Respondent after acquiring the tenanted premises filed eviction petition under Section 14D of the Act claiming herself to be widow and as such entitled to immediate possession. Appellant being the pre exist- E ing tenant sought leave to defend which was refused. Noticing the conflict in the views taken by the two benches of three learned judges on reference of the word 'let out' whether to refer only to creation of tenancy or it refers to mean, in the context of Section 14A, that even a transferee landlord can invoke the said provision. F Appellant contended that the premises in question had not been let out either by the respondent or her late husband, the petition under Section 14D, therefore, was not maintainable. The widow who applies for eviction of the tenant in occupation of the premises must establish that the premises were let out by her late husband or that the pre,mises G were let out by her and that she requires the same for her own residence. The language employed leaves no room for doubt that the widow open whom a special right has been conferred to claim immediate possession of premises after evicting the tenant must satisfy the condition that the premises were let out by her or by her husband. Clearly, therefore, if H 1141 1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. ) f -<I A this condition is not fulfilled Section 14D will not apply. It was also contended that she never attorned nor paid rent to the respondent and, . therefore, there did not exist landlord-tenant relationship between them . The Respondent contended that for the application of Section 14D B it is not necessary that the premises must have been let out either by the petitioning widow or by her husband. For the application of this Section it is enough to prove that she was the landlord of the premises and entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. The use of the words "let out by him" only convey the idea that the premises must be owned c by her directly and the lease must be under her .directly. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. The provisions contained in Section 14A to 14D being in the nature of exception to the main provision, they must be construed D strictly. Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours . of a beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain immediate possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements envisaged therein. In other words the conditions precedent contained therein must be complied with. [1154-A-B] E 1.2. Section 14D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possession of the premises let out "by her, or by her hus- band". The scheme ofthisSection appears to be that where the landlord is alive and the premises have been let out by him, he only can make an application for immediate possession of the premises for his own use. F Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, and his widow under Section 14D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the expression, "let out by him" in Section 14B and 14C and the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D have significance. [1158-E-F] G Β·l.3. Section 14D gives a right to file an application under that provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises. Consequently, if the premises had been let out by someone else, Section 14D will not apply. By expressly providing that ~ ( the premises must be one letΒ·out by her or by her husband, the legislature H has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA 11.43 let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may A have become its landlord. The expression. "let out by her, or by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So under
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