NASIRUDDIN AND ORS. versus SITA RAM AGARWAL

Citation: [2003] 1 S.C.R. 634 · Decided: 28-01-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.N. KHARE · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 8 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
NASfRUDDIN AND ORS. 
v. 
SITA RAM AGARWAL 
JANUARY 28, 2003 
B 
[V.N. KHARE, CJ., S.B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] 
Rent Control and Eviction: 
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950-Section 
C 13(4)-Default in deposit of rent-Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation 
Act-Held: Not applicable since the Rent Act did not confer power on the 
court to extend the period for depositing the rent or to condone the default-
Court can condone the default only when statute confers the power and not 
otherwise-Further since the deposit of rent does not require any application, 
D provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be extended where the default 
takes place in complying with an order under Section 13 (4)-Limitation Act, 
1963, Section 5. 
Interpretation of statutes-Scope of-Held: Court cannot enlarge the 
scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain 
E and unambiguous. 
The question which arose for consideration in this appeal was 
whether the delay in depositing the rent could be condoned under the 
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and whether 
the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable where 
F there is default in depositing the rent within the stipulated time by the 
tenant. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be 
G invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case 
the Court ~an iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the 
fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the 
language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract 
words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot 
H 
634 
+ 
)( 
NASlRUDDlN v. SIT A RAM 
635 
re~write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there A 
exists a presun1ption that the legislature has not used any superfluous 
words. It is well-settled that the real intention of the legislation must be 
gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression 
~shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute 
is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be B 
found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well-settled that 
when negative \Vords are used the courts will presume that the intention 
of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character. 
1648-B-DJ 
1.2. It is well-settled principle that if an act is required to be C 
performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would 
ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to 
perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to 
be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. 1648-E-FJ 
1.3. Wherever the Special Act provides for extension of time or D 
condonation of default, the Court possesses the power therefor, but where 
the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the 
default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the Court does 
not have the power to do so. In the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent 
and Eviction) Act, 1950 in the absence of such provisions, the Court does E 
not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to 
condone the default in depositing the rent. Therefore, Section 5 of the 
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable where there is a default in depositing 
the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act. It is true that the 
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 does not 
expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its F 
terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent 
by the tenant. 1649-A-DI 
1.4. On perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is evident that 
the question of its application would arise where any appeal or any G 
application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant 
or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not 
making the appeal or application within such period. Section 13(4) 
provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of 
sub-section (I), the tenant shall on the first date of hearing or on or before 
such date the Court may on the application fixed in this behalf or within H 
636 
SUPREME C

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.