NAROTTAMDAS versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
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820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I9ti4J NAROTIAMDAS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (P. B. GAJEN!>RAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATIJLLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.J โข Wages-Law passed fixing rates of minimum wages Tetros- pecti7J11ly-Effect of-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Act 11 of 1!!48}-Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1001 (Act 23 of 1961), s. 31A-Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962-Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 (Act No. 16. of 1962), ss. 2, 3 and 4-Constitution of India, Art. 19(l)(f) and (g). The aopellant was the manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory. Jn 1951, the State of Madhya Pradesh fixed rates of minimlJ!ll wages payable to workmen in accordance with the provisibns of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. These rates were revised in the year 1956 and new rates were notified by the Government ty a notification dated December 30, 1958 directing that these rates would come into force from January 1, 1959. The validity of this notification was successfully cllallenged by the appellant before the High Court. To meet the situation the Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages Act, 1961 giving effect to the impugned notification. Qn.ยทchallenge of this Act by the appellant and other Bidi manufactories, the High Court allowed the applications and restrained the Govern- ment from giving effect to the impugned notification. There- after, the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962 was PasOOd fixing rates of minimum wages retrospectively. The ordinance was later replaced by ;m Act, the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962. On challenge of the validity ol. this Act by the appellant, the High Court held the Act to be valid and disallowed the application. Jn this Court the validity of the Act was challenged on the ground (l) that in enacmng the Act of 1962 the Legislature was not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated December 30, 1958 which it was not competent to do, (2) that by giving retrospective effect to the rates of wages fixed bv this Act the State had put unreasonable restrictions on the appel- lant's fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) & (g) and (31 that by making the provisions of ss. 20 and 22 of the Central Act of 1948 applicable to the wages now fixed the Act had contravened Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Held: (i) The contention that the Act was not independent legislation cannot be accepted. Section 2 of the Act merely says that the expressions used in this Act shall have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. The definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to another Act is a well known device in legislative practice generally adopted for the sake of brevity. The definition would remain effective even after the other Act with reference to which the definition was given ceases to exist. This fact of defining expressions in an Act with reference to some other Act cannot therefore have the etr..,ct of making this Act dependent on such other Act. 7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 821 It is clear from s. 3 of the impugned Act that the legislature was fixing for itself the minimum rates of wages in certain scheduled employments. The fact that the rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act happened to t e the same as the rates fixed elsewhere cannot reasonably justify a conclusion that the validation of the old rates was being affected. In- dependent legislation does not cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it would have been if a validating Act had been passed. (ii) The retrospective operation of legislation is a relevant circumstance jn deciding its reasonableness. It is, however, not necessarily a decisive test. Section 3 of the Act does not make the new rates of w'1ges payable on the 1st January 1959. The proviso to s. 4 is a clear statement of the legislature's intention that it is on the 21st June 1962 that the rates which had become en- forceable under s. 3 with effect from 1st January 1959 became payable. The appellant's aDPrehension that he might be made liable for payment of compensation under s. 20(3) or to prosecu- tion under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 as a result of mere passing of the Act must therefore be held to be ground- less. The contention therefore that ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act impose unreasonat
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