NARESH SHRIDHAR MIRAJKAR AND ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
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NARFSH SHRIDHAR.,MIRAJKAR AND ORS. l'. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. March 3, 1966 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, J. R. MUDHOLKAR, S. M. SUCRJ, R. S. BACllAWAT AND V. R.\MASWAMI, JJ.). Practice ancl Procedure-Inherent jurisdiction of High Couri-Power to stop publication of proceedings of a trial-Order If violates fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a)-lf amenabl.e to proceedings under Alll. 32 of the Constitution. In a suit for defamation against the editor of a weekly newspaper, field on the original side of the High Court, one of the witnesses prayed that the Court may order that publicity should not be given to his evidence in the prOS$ as his business would be affected. After hearing arguments, the trial Judge passed an oral order prohibiting tho publication of the "'idenee of the witness. A reporter of the weekly along with othor jour- nalists moved this Court und-er Art. 32 challenging the validity of the order. It was contended that : (i) the High O>urt did not have inherent power to pass the order; (ii) the impugned order violated the funda- mental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)(a); and (iii) tho order was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. HELD: (i) (Per Gajendragadkar C. J., Wanchoo, Mudho!kar, Sikri, Bachawat and Ramawami, JI.) : As the impugned order must be held te> prevent the publication of the evidence of the witness during the COUille of the trial and not thereafter. and the order was passed to help tho administration of justice for the purpC>SC of obtaining true evidence in the case. the order was within the inherent power of the High Court. [754 A-B; 759 CJ The High Cou't has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of justice clcarll and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. Section 14 o the Official Secrets Act, 1923 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers in its opening clause, and s. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, saves the inherent power of the Hi&b Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abu.so of the process of the Court. Such a power includes the power to hold a part of the trial In camera or to prohibit ยซ<cessive publication of a part of rhe proceedings at such trial. [755 F: 759 C, G; 760 CJ Scott v. Scott, [1913) A.C. 417 and Moosbrugger v. Moosbrugger, (1912-13) 29 T.L.R. 658, referred to. Per Sarkar J. : The High Court has inherent power to prevent pub- lication of the proceedings of a trial. The power to ~t publication of proceedinp is a facet of the power to hold a trial in camera ond slSm from it. [776 CJ c D E F G Scolt v. Scott (1913) A.C. 417, explained. H p,,. Shah J. : The Code of Civil Procedure contains no express pro- vioion authorising the C'.ourt to bold its procecdinp In camera, but if โข ยทโข ' โข 746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 3 S.C.R. Further, the order is based on a good and valid law. The power to prohibit publication of proceedings is essentially the same as the power ID bold a trial in camer<1; and the law empowering a trial in camera is a valid law and does not ,iolate the fundamental right in regard to liberty of speech because, the person restrained is legally prevented from entering the Court and hearing the proceedings, and the liberty of speech is affected only indirectly. Moreover, the Jaw empowering a Court to prohibit publication of iL< proCC<:dings is protected by Art. 19(2), because, the Jaw relates lo contempt of Court and the restriction is reasonable as it U. based on the principle that publication would interfere with tho course of justice and us due admini<tration. [777 EยทG; 778 C-E, GI The Parbhani Transport Couper<Hive Society Lrd. v. RTA Aura1111abad, [1960) 3 S.C.R. and A. K. Gopa/a11 v. Srate, (1950] S.C.R. 88, follow- ed. Budhan Chowdhry v. The State. (1955) I S.C.R. 1045, explained. Per Shah J. : Jurisdiction to exercise these powers which may affect righti of persons other than tho>e who are parties to the litigation is either expressly granted to the Court by the statute or arises from the necessity to regulate the course of proceedings so as to make them an effective instmment for the administration of justice. An order made against a str3nger in aid of administration of justice between contending parties or for enforcement of iLs adjudication doe< not directly in
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