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NARESH SHRIDHAR MIRAJKAR AND ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.

Citation: [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744 · Decided: 03-03-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 31 judgment(s) · cites 5 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

NARFSH SHRIDHAR.,MIRAJKAR AND ORS. 
l'. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. 
March 3, 1966 
[P. B. 
GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, 
K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, 
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, S. M. SUCRJ, R. S. BACllAWAT 
AND V. R.\MASWAMI, JJ.). 
Practice ancl Procedure-Inherent jurisdiction of High Couri-Power to 
stop publication of proceedings of a trial-Order If violates fundamental 
right under Art. 19(1)(a)-lf amenabl.e to proceedings under Alll. 32 of 
the Constitution. 
In a suit for defamation against the editor of a weekly newspaper, 
field on the original side of the High Court, one of the witnesses prayed 
that the Court may order that publicity should not be given to his evidence 
in the prOS$ as his business would be affected. 
After hearing arguments, 
the trial Judge passed an oral order prohibiting tho publication of the 
"'idenee of the witness. A reporter of the weekly along with othor jour-
nalists moved this Court und-er Art. 32 challenging the validity of the 
order. 
It was contended that : (i) the High O>urt did not have 
inherent 
power to pass the order; (ii) the impugned order violated the funda-
mental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)(a); and (iii) tho order 
was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. 
HELD: (i) (Per Gajendragadkar C. J., Wanchoo, Mudho!kar, Sikri, 
Bachawat and Ramawami, JI.) : 
As the impugned order must be held 
te> prevent the publication of the evidence of the witness during the 
COUille of the trial and not thereafter. and the order was passed to help 
tho administration of justice for the purpC>SC of obtaining true evidence 
in the case. the order was within the inherent power of the High Court. 
[754 A-B; 759 CJ 
The High Cou't has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera 
if the ends of justice clcarll and necessarily require the adoption of 
such a course. 
Section 14 o 
the Official Secrets Act, 1923 in terms 
recognises the existence of such inherent powers in its opening clause, 
and s. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, saves the inherent power of the 
Hi&b Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of 
justice or to prevent abu.so of the process of the Court. 
Such a power 
includes the power to hold a part of the trial In camera or to prohibit 
ยซ<cessive publication of a part of rhe proceedings at such trial. [755 F: 
759 C, G; 760 CJ 
Scott v. Scott, [1913) A.C. 
417 and Moosbrugger v. 
Moosbrugger, 
(1912-13) 29 T.L.R. 658, referred to. 
Per Sarkar J. : The High Court has inherent power to prevent pub-
lication of the proceedings of a trial. The power to ~t 
publication 
of proceedinp is a facet of the power to hold a trial in camera ond 
slSm from it. [776 CJ 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Scolt v. Scott (1913) A.C. 417, explained. 
H 
p,,. Shah J. : The Code of Civil Procedure contains no express pro-
vioion authorising the C'.ourt to bold its procecdinp In camera, 
but if 
โ€ข 
ยทโ€ข 
' โ€ข 
746 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1966] 3 S.C.R. 
Further, the order is based on a good and valid law. The power to 
prohibit publication of proceedings is essentially the same as the power 
ID bold a trial in camer<1; and the law empowering a trial in camera is a 
valid law and does not ,iolate the fundamental right in regard to liberty 
of speech because, the person restrained is legally prevented from 
entering the Court and hearing the proceedings, and the liberty of speech 
is affected only indirectly. 
Moreover, the Jaw empowering a 
Court to 
prohibit publication of iL< proCC<:dings is protected by Art. 19(2), because, 
the Jaw relates lo contempt of Court and the restriction is reasonable as 
it U. based on the principle that publication would interfere with tho 
course of justice and us due admini<tration. [777 EยทG; 778 C-E, GI 
The Parbhani Transport Couper<Hive Society Lrd. v. RTA Aura1111abad, 
[1960) 3 S.C.R. and A. K. Gopa/a11 v. Srate, 
(1950] S.C.R. 88, follow-
ed. 
Budhan Chowdhry v. The State. (1955) I S.C.R. 1045, explained. 
Per Shah J. : 
Jurisdiction to exercise these powers which may affect 
righti of persons other than tho>e who are parties to the litigation is 
either expressly granted to the Court by the statute or arises from the 
necessity to regulate the course of proceedings so as to make them an 
effective instmment for the administration of justice. 
An order made 
against a str3nger in aid of administration of justice between contending 
parties or for enforcement of iLs adjudication doe< not directly 
in

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