NARENDRA BAHADUR SINGH AND ANR. versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

Citation: [1977] 2 S.C.R. 226 · Decided: 26-11-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA, V.R. KRISHNA IYER · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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226 
NARENDRA BAHADUR SINGH AND ANR. 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. 
November 26, 1976 
[H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.] 
U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act 1948 Sr.c. 2(7), 6, 
7(1)-Notification for acquiring land for a society of refugees from Pakistan 
-Whether acquisition notification can be struck down on hypertechnical grounds 
or whether substalltial compliance suffecient'-ln the ubsence of averments in 
a writ petition on a question of fact whethe1i petitioner can be \allowed to raisd 
a ground based on assumption of such facts. 
U .P. Government issued a notification under Section 7 (!) of the U .P. Land 
Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948 for acquiring the land 
belonging to the appellant for the purpose of Sufferers Cooperatiyc Housing 
Society. 
The Society entered into an agreement with· the Govcrnme.nt under 
sectiop. 6 of the Act. 
The Land Acquisition Officer determined the amount of 
compensation for the acquired land. 
The appellants challenged the \'alidity 
of the said notification on the following grounds : 
1. The notification did not properly specify 
the 
land sought 
to 
be 
acquired. 
2. The notification was ultra vires the Act because it sought to acquire 
land for the rehabilitation of displaced persons and not for the re-
habilitation of refugees. 
3. The notification was not in accorclance with the provisions of section 
7(1) of the Act. 
The single Judge of the High Court did not go into the first ground but 
accepted the second and third grounds and quashed the notification. He held 
tha* according to the definition of refugees in section 2(7) a refugee is a person 
who has migrated from Pakistan to any place in the U.P. and has been since 
td!en residing in U.P. and that there was nothing. to show that the displaced 
persons who are the members of the Society had settled in U.P. While accept-
ing the third ground the learned Judge held that section 7 ( 1) 
requires 
to 
indicate in the notification that i:t had decided to acquire the land. 
However, 
the notification did not mention the expression "decided". 
On an appeal, the Division Bench disagreed with the conclusions of the 
Single Judge and allowed the appeal. The Division Bench held that the notifi-
cation was substantially in accordance with the section 7 ( 1) and that the mem-
bers of the Society consisted of refugees. 
The Division Bench also held that 
the notification w.as not vague and it properlv ~pecified the land sought to be 
acquired. 
In an appeal by Special Leave the appellants repeated the 3 ground,,. 
Dismissing the appeal 
HELD : 1. The ground about the members of the Society not being refugees has 
not been taken in the Writ Petition at all. 
The question whether 
those members have settled in U.P. is essentially' one of tact. Jn the 
absence of any 
averment in the 
writ 
petition the 
material facts 
having bearing on the point could nob be brought on record. A 
party seeking to challenge the validity of a notification on a ground 
involving questions of fact should make necessary averments of fact 
before it can assail the notification on that ground. 
(229 F-H1 
,/#\. 
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N. B. SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Khanna, J.) 
227 
2. The recital in the earlier part of the notification as well as the opera-
tive part of the notification that the land sball be deemed to have 
been acquired permanently and shall vest in the State 
Government 
lends clear support to the conclusion tbat the State 
Government 
decided to acquire the land and the order of acquisition was me_rely 
an implementation of that decision. The fact that the word decided 
has not been used in the notification would not prove fatal when the 
entire tenor of the notification reveals the decision of the State Govt. 
to acquire land. 
The court would not strike down a notification for 
acquisition on hypertechnicality; what is needed is substantial compli-
ance with law and the impugned notification clearly satisfies that 
requirement. 
[230 D-FJ 
3. The contention that the notification in question is vague is not sub-
stantiated. 
The notification makes an express reference to the site 
plan. 
[230 G-231 A] 
A 
B 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1976. 
C 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 
16-10-74 of the Aliahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 169/72. 
S. T. Desai, M. K. Garg, K. B. Rohtagi, V. K. Jain and M. M. 
Kaslzyap, for the App

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