LexNARAYAN GOVIND GAVATE ETC. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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r 763 NARAYAN GOYIND GAVATE ETC. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA October 11, 1976 [A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT S!NGlf, JJ.] Land Acquisition· Act, 1894, ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of establishing urgency-On whom lies. Certain lands were sought to be acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the public purpose stated being the develbpment and utilisation oti the lands as a residenJial and industrial area. Identical notifications under s. 4 were issued in all the cases. In one group of A B lands, declarations that the provisions of s. 5A shall not apply in respect of the C lands Vier~ issued under s. 17 ( 4). With respect to a second group, declara- tions under s. 17 ( 4) were issued but were not followed up with the s. 6-notifi- cation. With respect to a third group no notification under s. 17 ( 4) was issued but after the petitioners filed objections, the s. 6-notification was issued accom- panied by the declaration of urgency under s. 17 ( 4). The owners of the land sought to have the proceedings quashed on the grounds that, (1) there was no public purpose, and that (2) there was no urgency justifying the notification under s. 17 ( 4) and dispensing with the enquiry under D s. SA. . The High Court held that, ( l) the notifications under s. 4 (l) were valid, and that (2) the State had not discharged its burden of showing facts con•titut- ing the urgency which impelled it to issue the declarations under s. 17 ( 4) di~ pensing with the enquiry under s. 5A, and, therefore, those declaration.s were invalid, and that the parties were relegated to the position they could take up iu the absence of declarations under s. 17 ( 4). Both sides appealed to this Court. In the appeals by the State, it was contended by the appellant-State that E the burden of proving that there was no urgency was on the owners of tho lands. Dismissing all the appeals, HELD: (!) Th~ notifications under s. 4(1) of the Act were valid i• all the cases. [769 G] (2) (a) The rules regarding burden of proof are set ont in the Indian Evi- F dence Act, 1872. Section 101 of the Evidence Act Jays down that whoever desires any Conrt to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependrni on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist, and s. 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Sectioa 103 provirles that the burden of proof as to anv narticular fact lies on that person who wishe11 the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided lly any la·w that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Section 106 lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any G person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 114 of the Evi- dence Act covers a wide range of presumptions of fact which can be used by the Courts.,jp the course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the chain of direct evidence before it. (774· C-E; 775 C-E] • (b) The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts, circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trinl or proceeding which cannot, II for pu rprn;es of this final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnect- ed parts. What is weighed at the end is one totality against another and not 17-1234SCI/76 A B c D E F G H 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [I 977] 1 S.C.R. selected bits or scraps of evide~ce against each other. Such total cff~ct. of evidence is determined at the entl of a proceeding not merely by _..:onstdenn.g the "eneral duties imposed by ss. 101 and 102 but also by the spec1al or parll- <:ula~ ones imposed by other provisions suCh as ss. 103 and 106. In judging whether a general or' particular or special onus has been iischargcd the _Court v.·ill not only consider the direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also v.·hat may be indirectly inferred because certain facts have been proved or not proved though easily capable of proof if they existed at all and such proof of other facts may raise either a presumption of Ia:w or fac~. The party_ against \Vhich a presumption may operate can and must lead the ev1de1~
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