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NARAIN AND TWO OTHERS versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 724 · Decided: 04-12-1958 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

72' 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp. 
1958 
operation the ea.me da.y, a.re repugnant to ea.ch other, 
that which last received the Roya.I assent must prevail 
Asβ€’ v~""' 
a.nd be considered pro ta.nto a repeal of the other." 
He Dist.ic1 Board, Again in Daw, Clerk of the Commissioner of Sewers of 
Muzaffa.nagβ€’β€’ the City of London v. The Metropolitan Board of Worka 
( 1 ), it wa.s held-
Wβ€’β€’,hoo J. 
"Where two statutes give authority to two public 
bodies to exercis!l powers which cannot consistently 
_with the object of the Legislature co-exist, the earlier 
must necessarily be repealed by the later statute." 
In that case the conflict \11'.&S between s. 145 of the City 
of London Sewers Act, 1848 a.nd s. 141 of the Metro-
polis Local Ma.na.gement Act, 1855, a.nd the later wa.s 
held to prevail. 
The principle of these cases will 
apply to the present circumstances, and if the words 
" town area. committee " are not held to be a transla-
tion of the words " town panchayat ", the result is 
that a Town Area Committee being vested with 
power under s. 26 (a) to regulate offensive trades or 
callings, the power of the Town Area. Committee must 
prevail over the power of the' District Board under 
s. 174(l)(k) of the District Boards Act. We, therefore, 
allow the a.ppea.l, set aside the order of the High Court 
a.nd order the acquittal of Asa Ram a.ppella.nt. 
Appeal allowed. 
NARAIN AND TWO OTHERS 
v. 
THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
(GAJENDRAGADKAR and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.) 
Criminal Trial-Material witness, who is-Failure to examine 
-Effect of-If amounts to rejection of evidence-Indian Evidence 
Act, r87z (I of r87z), s. r67. 
Several persons attacked and seriously injured one M. After 
assaulting him the assailants were carrying him away when M's 
brother R came to rescue him and in self defence shot dead one 
of the assailants and carried M away. For the assault on M eight 
persons, including the appellants, were tried for offences under 
(1) (1862) C.P. u C.B.N.S. 16x; (1862) 133 R.R. 311. 
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
721$ 
I 
ss. 148, 307 and 364 both read with ss. 149 and 34 of the Indian 
Penal Code. 
At the trial R was cited as a witness by the prosei-
cution, but R refused to give evidence claiming protection under 
Art. 20 of the Constitution. The Sessions Judge upheld R's 
objection and the prosecution gave him up as a witness. After 
trial, the Sessions Judge acquitted four of the accused but con~ 
victed the appellants and one other person. In appeal before 
the High Court the appellants urged that the Sessions Judge wa11 
wrong in holding that R was entitled to the protection of Art. 2~ 
and that the trial was vitiated by th;s decision whereby the 
accused had been deprived of the benefit of R's evidence. 
Th~ 
High Court was of the view that if R had been compelled t!> 
give evidence he would not have supported the prosecution but 
whatever he would have stated would not have rebutted the 
convincing testimony of the other witnesses and that therefore 
the failure to.examine R did not in any way affect the ultimate 
d.ecision of the case. The High Court apparently had s. 167 of 
the Evidence Act in view. In the result the High Court uphelfl 
the convictions. The appellants appealed and contended tha:t 
t:he view of the High Court was not justified by s. 167 and that 
the trial was not fair as R, a material witness, had been kept 
out of Court. 
Held, that the trial was not vitiated by the failure of the 
prosecution to examine R as a witness. Section 167 did not help 
the appellants as it was not a case in which evidence could be 
said to have been rejected within the meaning of that section. 
Further, R was not a witness material to the prosecution ina11-
much as he arrived on the scene after the assault was over and it 
was not necessary for the prosecution to examine him to ensure 
a fair trial. Where a material witness has been deliberately !>r 
unfairly kept back, a serious reflection is cast on the propriety bf 
the trial and the validity of the conviction resulting from it may 
be open to challenge. The test whether a witness is material .is 
whether he is essential to the unfolding of the narrative on 
which the prosecution is based and not whether he would have 
given evidence in support of the defence. 
, 
Habeeb Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad, [1954] S.C.R. 
475; Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 289. 
CRIMINAL 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Crimin1tol 
Appeal No. 186 of 1956. 
Appeal 

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