NANI GOPAL MITRA versus THE STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [1969] 2 S.C.R. 411 · Decided: 15-10-1968 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
NANI GOPAL MITRA 
v. 
THE S;I'ATE OF BIHAR 
October 15, 1968 
B 
(J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] 
.... 
Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947 s. 5(1), (2) and (3)-
After conviction of appellant under s. 5 (2) and before hearing of appeal 
by High Court, s. 5(3) repealed-If presumption ins. 5(3) could be in-
voked an appeal. 
S. SA-Magistrate not gtv1ng reasons for 
pernlltt1ng Officer other 
C 
than D.S.P. to investigate-If non-contpliance with section. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Particulars-Insufficient porticulars given 
in the 
charge-Appellant 
not complaining at trial or before High Court-Effect of. 
In connection with an investigation in January 1958 relating to an-
other case, the appellant, who was employed as a railway guard on the 
Eastern Railway, was found in possession of pecuniary resources dispro-
portionate to his known sources of income. 
As it was thought that he 
had come in possession of these Pecuniary resources by committing acts 
of misconduct defined in clauses (a) to (d) of s. 5(1) of the Prevention 
of Corruption Act 2 of 1947. on the recommendation of the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police for the area, an Inspector of Police was appoint-
ed by an Ordi:r dated 27th February 1959 of the Magistrate, 1st Class, 
Sahibganj, to investigate the case against the appellant. 
The Investiga-
ting Officer, upon completion of the investigation and after 
obtaining 
sanction of the appropriate authority for prosecution of the appellant, 
submitted a charge sheet on March 31, 1960. The Trial Court convicted 
the appellant under s. 5(2) of the Act and s. 411 I.P.C. 
In appeal, by 
a judgment dated September 14, 1965, the High Court set aside the con-
viction and sentence of the appellant under s. 411 J .P .C. but confirmed 
his conviction under s. 5 (2) of the Act and reduced the sentence awarded 
by the Trial Court. 
On December 18. 1964 Parliament enacted the Anti-Corruption Laws 
(Amendment) Act 40 of 1964 which repealed sub-section (3) of s. 5 
of the; Act and enlarged the scope of criminal misconduct in s. 5 by 
inserting a new clause (e) in s. 
5(1) 
of the Act. 
In appeal 
to 
this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant (i) that s. 5(3) 
of the Act having been repealed while the appeal was pending in the 
High Court, the presumption enacted in s. 5 (3) was not available to 
the prosecuting authorities after the repeal and it was not open to the 
High Court. to invoke the presumption in considering the case against 
the appellant; the presumption contained iri s. 5 (3) was a rule of pro-
cedural law and as alterations in the form of procedure are always re-
trospective in character, unless it was 
provided otherwise, 
it was not 
open to the High Court to apply the presumption in the present case; 
(ii) that the statutory safeguards under s. 5A of the Act had not beeo 
complied with as the Magistrate had not given reasons for entrusting the 
investigation to a Police Officer below ·the rank of Deputy Superintendent 
of Police; and (iii) that the charge against the appellant under s. 5(2) 
of the Act was defective1 as .there were no specific particulars of mis90n". 
duct as envisaged under clauses (a) to (d) of s. 5(1) df the Act, nothing 
was stated about the amounts the appellant took as bribes and · the 
' 
412 
SUPREME COURT R.llPORTS 
[1969] 2 S.C.R. 
persons from whom he had taken such bribes so that the appellant had 
A 
no opportunity to rebut the presumption raisecl under s. 5 ( 3) of the 
Act and to prove his innocence. 
HEW : 
Dismissing the appeal : 
(i) The High Court was right 
invoking 
the 
presumption 
under 
s. 5(3) of the Act even though it was repealed on December 18, 1964 
by the Amending Act. 
B 
Although as a general rule the amended law relating to procedure 
operates retrospectively, there is another equally important 
principle, 
which is also embodied in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, that a statute 
should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations. 
or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were 
complete 
at the time the amending Act came into force. 
The effect of the appli-
cation of this principle is that pending cases although instituted under 
the old. Act but still pending are governed by the new procedure under 
the amended law, but whatever procedure was correctly adopted and con-
cluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of 
applying the new procedure. 
In the present case, the trial of the appel-
la

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