LexNAGENDRA NATH MONDAL versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
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NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL
v.
mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
January 13, 1972
[1. M. SHl!LAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]
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West Beng4l Prevention of Violent A.ct/vlll.,
A.ct, 1910--Sectlon
3(2)(b)-A.cts prejudicial to the maintenonce of public. order-Tests for
determining.
Practice and procedure-Habeas Corpus-Grounds not urged In
th•
petition, if can be urged.
The petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of
Violent Activities Act, 1970. The grounds for detention staled that he,
along with others, on two occasions, entered the premises of eduealiotial
institutions, set fire to books, registers, furniture etc., placed bombs in the
building and threatened the staff with death and thereby committed "mil-
chief" disturbin~ "public order" within the meaning of S. 3(2)(b) of the
Act. The petitioner's representation was received by the State Government
on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971 the petitioner's case was placed be-
fore the Advisory Board. The State Govel'nment considered the represen-
tation and rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971
the Board reported that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the
P'~titioner's detention.
The petitioner sent his habeas corpus petition from jail in which he
denied the allegations made ag<linst him. At the hearing of the petition,
the counsel for the petitioner raised two additional grounds (i) that the
grounds furnished to thll detenu did not constitute breach of public order,
and therefore, the detention was illegal; and (li) that the delay in consl-
d-M'ing the petitioner's representation was inordinate, iand ther.efore, was in
violation of Artic!!e 22(5) of Con,titution.
Dismissing the petition,
HELD : (i) According to th;: Report of the Advisory Board, there
was sufficient material justifying the order and in the absence of any
definite material, it is not possible to. accept the vague allegations by the
petitioner. [78 El
(ii) Ordinarily grounds which do not find any place in the petition
would not be permitted to be raised before this Court. But since this was
a habeas corpus petition and, furtherm~re, made by the petitioner from
jail such grounds could be allowed to be raised. [78 Fl
(iii) The true distinction between the area of Jaw and order and public
order is ode of degree of extent of the breach of the act in question upon
society.
Any 'contravention of law always affects order, but before it
could be said to affect 'public order' it must affect the community at large.
Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and clrcum·
stances might affect the problem of Jaw and order and in another, the
breach of public order. Thll anaolgy of crimes against individuals and
crimes against the public, though usdful to a limited extent, would not
always be apt. [79 li-80 Bl .
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
Lohia v. State [1966] I S.C.R, 709, Pushkar Mukhtrl., v. West Bengal
f,19691 2 S.C.R. 635: Arun Gho.h v. West Bengal [!9701 3 S.Gl.R. 288
and S. K. Sah• v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [19701 3 S.C.R. '360
r~erred to.
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(iv) The distinction drawn by Clause (b) of S. 3(2) is between caus·
ing fire to building of an educational institution simp/iciler arid CQ!Illllitting
mischief of the same nature but such that it disturbs or is likely to
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disturb the even tempo of the community in that particular locality. The
object of the acts complained of. as vandalism, to disturb .pie working
of the institution by burning its records and to create a scare so that
neitl:\er the teaching staff, nor the pupils would ,dare attend it for prose-
cution of studies. In these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely
constitute mischief under S. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such
mischief which disturbed or was likely to disturb public order and, there-
fore, fell within the definition in Sectio~ 3(2)(b). [81 G, HJ
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(v) In the circumstances of the present case, it oannot be held that
the delay w .. so inordinate as to affect the validity of the detention. No
doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was 34 days, but most of
it was due to the fact that the representation and the record remained
w;th the Board. In a given case, Government may not be able to reach
a proper conclusion within a sho'rt time especially, where another authority
has passed ·the questioned order. {83 Pl !ayanarayan Sukul v.
West
D.
Ben!!al fl9701 3 S.C.R. and KhalrExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.