LexNAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR versus STATE OF GUJARAT
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B [2010] 11 S.C.R. 414 NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF GUJARAT (Civil Appeal No. 7519 of 2010) SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, K.S. PANICKER RADHAKRISHNAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.] Land Ceiling - Gujarat Agricultural Lar:ids Ceiling Act, C 1960 (as amended by Act 2of1974)- ss.2(1), 2(6), 2(17) and 5 - "Bid lands" held by the appellants claimed as uncultivable waste lands - Whether such "bid lands" were required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, as amended D by Act 2 of 1974 - Held: The definition of "land" under the 1960 Act was specifically amended by the Amendment Act 2 of 1974 to include "bid lands'; without limiting the same to cultivable bid lands - This specific intention of the Legislature must be given its full meaning - Moreover, the subject lands E survived acquisition under the 1952 Act only because they were "bid lands" which by definition under that Act were treated as lands being used by the Girasdars for grazing cattle - Under the Ceiling Act, s.2(1) defines the use of land for the purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural purpose - Thus, F "bid lands" fall under s.2(1) of the Ceiling Act - Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952. In the instant appeals, the question for consideration before the Court was: whether the bid lands held by the appellants were required to be taken into considera~ion G for the purpose of land ceiling under the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, as amended by Act 2 of 1974, which came into force from 1.4.1976. H 414 NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF GUJARAT Dismissing the appeals, the Court 415 A HELD:1.1. The argument made by the appellants, that the legislative intent behind enacting clause (e) of Explanation I to Section 2(6) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 was to include only cultivable 8 lands in the definition of "dry crop lands" as the ultimate object of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 is to fix a ceiling on lands held for agricultural purpose and consequently "bid lands" which are uncultivable waste lands cannot be included in Explanation l(e), has no merit. The definition of "land" under the 1960 Act was C specifically amended by the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act 2 of 1974 to include "bid lands" of Girasdars or Barkhalidars in Section 2(17)(ii)(c) of the 1960 Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act also makes it clear that there was a D specific legislative intent of including "bid lands" of Girasdars or Barkhalidars within the definition of "land". This inclusion does not make any distinction between cultivable and uncultivable bid lands. The insertion of bid lands in Section 2(17) is without any such qualification. E Therefore, this specific intent of the Legislature must be given its full meaning. [Para 9) [428-E-H; 429-A-B] 1.2. If the argument of the appellants is to be accepted, it would defeat the very purpose of the 1960 F Act because in that event a holder could hold lands to an unlimited extent by including waste lands in drought- prone areas, hill areas and waste lands within their holdings. Moreover, the subject lands survived acquisition under the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, G 1952 only because they were "bid lands" which by definition under those Acts were treated as lands being used by the Girasdars for grazing cattle. Now, under the present Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the use of land •' H 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R. A for the purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural purpose. Thus, "bid lands" fall under Section 2(1) of the Ceiling Act. This is one more reason for coming to the conclusion that the Ceiling Act as amended applies to "bid lands". Under Section 5(1) of the 1952 Act all lands B saved from acquisition had to be "bid lands" which by definition under Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act were the lands being used by a Girasdar or a Barkhalidar for grazing cattle or for cutting grass. If the lands in question were put to any other use, they were liable to acquisition c under Section 5(2). Because the subject lands were used for grazing cattle, they got saved under the 1952 Act a,nd, therefore, it is now not open to the appellants to contend that the subject lands are not capable of being used for agricultural purpose. [Para 9] [429-B-
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.