N. RAJENDRAN versus S. VALLI

Citation: [2022] 16 S.C.R. 498 · Decided: 03-02-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.M. JOSEPH · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 16 S.C.R.
N. RAJENDRAN
v.
S. VALLI
(Civil Appeal No. 3293 of 2012)
FEBRUARY 03, 2022
[K. M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – ss.13(1)(ia), 15 – Family Courts
Act, 1984 – ss. 19, 20 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s. 29 – Cruelty –
Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Dissolution of Marriage –
Case of appellant that respondent left appellant and returned to
her parental home – Divorce petition by appellant on ground of
cruelty – Family Court allowed divorce petition – Respondent filed
appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 before the
High Court – Appellant contended that the time for filing an appeal
had expired and so he had re-remarried on the strength of the decree
of dissolution of marriage – Respondent later filed a petition seeking
restitution of conjugal rights u/s. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which
was still pending – High Court reversed the decree of dissolution of
the marriage between the appellant and the respondent holding
there was no cruelty – On appeal, held: Appellant failed in
persuading Court to hold that the appeal was not filed within the
period stipulated u/s. 19 of the Family Courts Act – The second
marriage of the appellant took place in contravention of mandate
of s.15 of the Hindu Marriage Act – High Court was right in its
finding – There was no cruelty – No possibility of rapproachement
between appellant and respondent – Marriage between appellant
and respondent is dead – In exercise of power u/Art. 142 of the
Constitution, marriage between appellant and respondent declared
as dissolved.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. On perusal of rule 52 of the Family Courts
(Procedure) Rules, 1996. It plainly would suffice to repel the
contention of the appellant that an appeal can be maintained within
thirty days even if it is in the absence of a certified copy. Coming
further to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant
that Section 19 overrides the provisions of the Code of Civil
[2022] 16 S.C.R. 498
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Procedure and there may not be any need to have a certified
copy of the judgment, this Court finds this argument to be clearly
untenable having regard to Rule 52 made by the Madras High
Court under the said Section 21 of the very Act namely, the Family
Courts Act. The non-obstante clause in Section 19 actually has a
different purport and scope and it was not meant to sweep away
all requirements as existed in law for maintaining an appeal. [Para
23][515-C-D]
2. Equally, without substance is the contention of the
appellant based on Section 19(3) of the Act. It constituted a special
law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It
must be noticed that the Family Courts Act itself was based on
the overwhelming realization that a specialized institution which
must resort increasingly to efforts of reconciliation between the
parties be established. It must be noticed that even with the
promulgation of the Act, unless a Family Court is established,
the Courts which were earlier dealing with the provisions would
continue to have jurisdiction. With the establishment of Family
Court and the jurisdiction it was to exercise under Section 7 of
the Act, this Court is of the view that the Family Courts Act must
be read along with the cognate enactments. In other words, the
Family Courts Act is not a standalone Act. It draws sustenance
from Acts like the Hindu Marriage Act. This is for the reason
that a petition within the meaning, for instance, of the Hindu
Marriage Act, after a Family Court is established in India, is to
be dealt with by the Family Court, on the grounds as provided
under the Hindu Marriage Act. In fact, a mere perusal of Section
7 of the Family Courts Act would show that it speaks about suits
and proceedings. Therefore, reading Section 7 of the Family
Courts Act with Section 29 of the Limitation Act, also fortifies us
in our finding that the word ‘proceedings’ within the meaning of
Section 29(3) is to be confined to the original proceedings. [Para
24][515-E-H; 516-A]
3. This court also does not find any merit in the contention
based on Section 20. Section 20 gives overriding effect to the
Family Courts Act, notwithstanding anythingwhich is inconsistent
with any other Act. It is true that it is intended to have an
overwhelming sway even in the teeth of other provisions. But in
N. RAJENDRAN v. S. VALLI
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