MURARI LAL S/O RAM SINGH versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [1980] 2 S.C.R. 249 · Decided: 21-11-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. SARKARIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 9 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

MURARI LAL S/o RAM SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
November 21, 1979 
249 
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[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
) 
Evidence Act-Expert opinion-Testimony of handwriting expert-If could 
not be 
accepted 
without 
corroboration-Opinion 
evidence-Ur 
nature-
Explained. 
The appellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of the 
deceased. The two vital pieces of evidence on which he was convicted were : 
(1) recovery of a wrist watch which belonged to the deceased at the instance 
of the appellant and (2) a note written in pencil in1 Hindi! found by the side of 
the deadman on the night of the occurrence stating "Though we OOve passed 
B.A. we have not secured any employment because there is none to care. This 
is the ronsequence". 
He was convicted under s. 302, l.P.C. and sentenced to death. On appeal 
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the High Court altered the conviction from s. 302 to s. 302 read with s. 34, 
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l.P.C. 
Jn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that it 
was not permissible in Jaw -to act upon uncorroborated opinion evidence of a 
hand\vriting expert and that the High Court fell into a serious error in attempt-
ing to compare the writing with the admitted writing of the appellant; (2) the 
appellant could not be the author of the note because while he was not even a 
matriculate the author described himself as a graduate and that a murderer and 
robber would not have left behind a note of the kind found by the side of the 
dead man. 
Dismiising the appeal, 
HELD: 1. An expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for con-
demning the opinion-evidence of an expert to the same class of evidence 
at> 
that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. 
The view occasionaly 
expressed that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion 
of an expert-handwriting expert or any other kind of expert-without substan-
tiaJ corroboration is not, because experts in: general, are unreliable witnesses, but 
because all human j~dgment is fallible. 
The more developed and the 
more 
perfect a science, the less the -c.hance of an incorrect opinion. 
The sc&nce of 
identification of handwriting unlike the science of identification of finger prints 
which has attained near-perfection is not quite perfect and the risk is, therefore, 
higher. 
Bnt that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of & handwriting ex-
pert as an invariabJe rule and issisting upon substantial corroboration in everv 
case, howsoever the opinion n1ay be backed by the soundest of reasons. 
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export opinion llels to be tested by the· acceptability of ihe reasons given by him. 
An expert depo<;e• and not decides. 
His duty is to furnish !he judge with 
the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion so as 
to e110ble the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application 
&f these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. [253 A-G] 
17-868SCI/79 
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250 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1980] 2 s.c.R. 
2. 
The1 e is no ru]e of h:1v.' nor any rule. of prudence which has crystallised 
int0> a rule of 1aw that opinior~ evidence of ai hand-writing expert must n~ver be 
acted upon unless substantially corroborated. 
But having due regard 
to 
the 
iroperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach 
should be one of caution. 
Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed 
and examined. 
All other relcva-nt evidence must be considered. 
In appropriate 
cases, corroboration may be sought. 
In cases where the reasons for the opinion 
are convincing and there is no reliable evidence tbrO\'Jing a doubt, the uncarro-
borated testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. There cano4tt be 
an inflexible rule on a matter v.1hich, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than o 
question of testimonial weight. 
[258 A·D] 
3. Section 73 of Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare dis· J
puted writin2s with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing 
is that of the pmon by whom it purports to have been written. 
If it is ' 
hazardous to do so, it is one of the hazards to which a judge and litigant must 
expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. 
In cases where both sidea 
call experts it becomes the plain duty of the cou,rt to compare the writings and 
come to its own conclusion. Where there are expett opinions, they will aid the 
Court. Where there is none the Court will have to see\.::

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