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MUNNA @ POORAN YADAV versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [2008] 15 S.C.R. 279 · Decided: 04-11-2008 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.K. JAIN · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 279 
' 
MUNNA@ POORAN YADAV 
A 
II. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1025 of 2006) 
NOVEMBER 4, 2008 
B 
[D.K. JAIN AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder - Prosecution of 
three accused - Sole eye-witness related to the deceased -
c 
Conviction of the appellant-accused uls, 302 and of the co-
; 
accused u/s. 302134 by trial court - High Court confirming 
conviction of appellant-accused - Acquittal of co-accused 
giving them benefit of doubt - On appeal, held: Order of High 
Court justified - Facts of the case support the prosecution 
D 
case - The evidence of the eye-witness is reliable and has 
~ 
been appreciated by courts blow with caution - Hence cannot 
be discarded his being sole eye-witness and related witness ยท 
- Evidence of the eye-witness also cannot be discarded on 
the principle of Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus - Appellant-
accused is not entitled to parity with the co-accused. 
E 
Appellant-accused alongwith two other accused (A2 
and A3) was prosecuted for having caused death of one 
person. Prosecution case was that the accused persons 
--! 
entered the house of the deceased and took him out. A-
F 
2 and A-3 caught hold of the hands of the deceased and 
the appellant-accused fired at him, as a result of which 
---\ 
he died on the spot. PW-4 (father of the deceased) was 
<. 
the sole eye-witness to the incident. Trial Court convicted 
appellant-accused uls 302 IPC, while acquitted him ulss. 
G 
25 and 27 of Arms Act. A-2 and A-3 were convicted uls. 
302/34 IPC. High Court confirmed the conviction of the 
appellant accused. However, A-2 and A-3 were acquitted 
' 
giving them benefit of doubt. 
.. 
279 
H 
280 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2008] 15 S.C.R. 
/ 
A 
~n appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the 
evidence of PW4 should not have been relied upon 
because he was the sole eye-witness, was a related 
witness and his evidence was not believed in so far as it 
related to A-2 and A-3; that the appellant has been 
B falsely implicated; time of death as given by prosecution 
is incorrect; that the appellant should also have been 
acquitted by reason of parity with A2 and A-3; and that 
as the shock had not been caused by the appellant, the 
offence would be minor and not u/s. 302 IPC. 
c 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
' , 
HELD: 1.1 This court can and may convict relying on 
' 
the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly 
reliable and that there was no legal impediment in 
D convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single 
witness. In the instant case, not only was the evidence 
of PW-4 acceptable but it was also corroborated by his 
immediate disclosure to P.W.5 and P.W.8. It was, therefore, 
rightly accepted and acted upon. [Para 18] [291-G-H; 292-
E A] 
Kunju l/ias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2008) 
2 SCC 151 and Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 
(1957) SC 614, relied on. 
..._ 
F 
1.2. True, it is that P.W.4 is a relation witness and as 
such requires a closer scrutiny keeping that factor in 
mind. The High Court was quite alive to the fact that it was 
the evidence of a near relation and therefore court had 
( 
to use caution. Such caution was exercised by the High 
G Court while appreciating the evidence of PW4 and the 
High Court was right in accepting his evidence. The court 
should not only exercise the caution while appreciating 
such evidence of relation witness but also it should be 
: 
seen from the judgment. The courts below have not only 
H exercised caution but it is also apparent from the 
MUNNA@POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 
281 
PRADESH 
judgments that such caution is in fact exercised. [Para 11] 
A 
[287-F-H; 288-A] 
2. It cannot be said that the death must have 
occurred much more than 24 hours earlier to the hour of 
the post mortem i.e. near about 36 hours. The post B 
mortem clearly suggests that the death must have 
-4 
occurred between 24 hours to 36 hours. Therefore, if the 
death is 24 hours prior to the post mortem with a 
difference of about 2-3 hours as admitted by the doctor 
in his cross examination then it is obvious that the death c 
might have occurred in the morning of 01.02.1997 which 
completely matches the testimony of P.W.4. It is nowhere 
tried to be brought out in the cross-examination that the 
death had not occurred 24 hours prior to the post mortem 
examination or that it had occurred much before that i.e. 
D 
~ > 
about 36 hours. No suggestion was put to t

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