MUNICLPAL BOARD, HAPUR versus RAGHUVENDRA KRLPAL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1966] 1 S.C.R. 950 · Decided: 23-09-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

MUNICll'AL BOARD, HAPUR 
v. 
RAGHUVENDRA KRll'AL AND OTHERS 
September 23, 1965 
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.) 
U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). ss. 131 to 135-Sections 131 to 
134 whether mandatory-Section 135(3) whether ultra vires-Whether 
suffers from excessive delegation or discrimination-Whether bad as con· 
Je"ing judicial functions on State Government. 
The appellant Board passed a special resolution on September 28, 1956, 
imposwg water-tax in Hapur and a notification by the Uttar Pradesh Gov-
ernment was published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazelle under s. 135(2) of 
the U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) notifying the resolution. Fifteen 
house-owners of llapur "·ho received notices from the appellant lloard 
for the payment of the tax petitioned to the High Court under Art. 220 
of the Constilution and asked for a writ or order preventing the appel-
lant Board from realising the tax. 
'lne main objections were (a) that 
the resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not pub-
lished in a local paper of Hapur published in Hindi and ( b) that the rules 
framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution 
which was affixed on the notice board at the office of the appellant Board 
in purported compliance with the requirement> for publication. 
The 
imposition was also challenged on the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the 
Constitution were violated. 
A single judge of the High Court held that 
the tax was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the Muni-
cipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board while im-
posing the tax and thats. 135(3) of the Act (which cures all defects in the 
imposition of the tax by making the notification of Gover1)ment conclu-
sive evidence of 1hc legality of the imposition) was iiltra vire.-r Art. 14 
of the Constitution because it created a bar against proof and left no 
remedy to the lax payers thereby making a discrimination hetwecn them 
and other litigants. 
He further held that the sub-section by making 
Government the sole judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial 
power on Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. 
The appellant Board appealed under the Letters Patent. The Di\isional 
Bench upheld the order of the single judge. The case was however certi-
fied as fit for appeal under Art. 
133 and the Board appealed to thio 
Court. 
The contentions raised in appeal were : (i) s.135 (3) shut> out all 
enquiry into the procedure by which a tax had been imposed and there-
fore suffered from exce-;sive delegation of legislative function: (ii) The 
tAX had not been validly imposed as there had been non--0bservance of 
rnandatorv provisions; (iii) s. 135(3) was discriminatory; and (iv) the 
aulHlection was also bad because it conferred judicial functions on the 
State Government. 
HELD : Per Gajendragadkar, C.J .. Hidayatullah, Shah 
and 
Sikri. 
JJ.-(i) The rule of conclusive evidence in s.135(3) does not 'hut out 
all enquiry by court_s. 
There are certain matters which cann~ b~ estab~ 
lished by a notification under s.135(3). 
For example no nollficatton can 
issue unless there is a special resolution under s. 134. The special resolu-
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MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA 
951 
tion i.o a sine qua non for the notification. Again the notification cannot 
authorise the imposition of a tax not included in s. 128 of the Municipali· 
ties Act. 
Neither the Municipal Board nor the State Government can 
exercise snch power. What the section does is to put beyond question the 
procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say the various steps 
taken to impose it. A tax, not authorised, can never be within the pro-
tection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may 
be challenged, not with reference to the manner of imposition but as an 
illegal impost. [958 A-DJ 
(ii) There can be no doubt that some of the provisions of ss. 131 to 
134 of the Act are mandatory. 
But all of them are not of the same 
character. In the present case, as in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. and in 
Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati, the provisions not observed were of a directory 
character and therefore the imposition had the protection of s. 135(3). 
[958 HJ 
Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur. [1965] l 
S.C.R. 970 and Berar Swades/Ji Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee, Com-
mittee Sheogaon 

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