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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI versus SURESH CHANDRA JAIPURIA & ANR.

Citation: [1977] 2 S.C.R. 10 · Decided: 03-11-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.N. RAY, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, JASWANT SINGH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
10 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI 
v. 
SURESH CHANDRA JAIPURIA & ANR. 
November 3, 1976 
[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] 
. 
Civil Procedure Code Sec. 115-Concurrent decisions 011 question of facts;. 
znterfere11ce by High Court, whether justified-Specific Relief Act, 1963 
S. 
41 (h) applicatio11. 
The re~pondent purchased a house, and under the sale-deed became respon· 
sible for paying the house-tax subsequent to the purchase. On his failure to pay 
the same, the appellant corporation started proceedings agairu;t him 
for 
the · 
realisation of dues. 
In the course of a suit for permanent injun~tion, the res-
pondent's application for an interim injunction was rejected by two courts. 
On 
further appeal, the High Court granted him interim injunction on the ground 
that there was a prima facie case even though agreeing with the appellate court 
that the balance of convenience was against such grant. 
Allowing the appeal the Court, 
HBLD : 1. Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, lays down that an 
, I 
injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an 
... 
equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any otht'.lr usual mode or proceedings 
except in cases of breach of.trust. [13E-F] 
2. While exercising its jurisdiction under s. 115 the High 
Court is 
not 
competent to correct assumed erroneous findings of fact. The High Court had 
E 
itself erred plainly both in holding that the courts below had not taken a correct 
view of the prima facie case which existed here and that the question of bafance 
of convenience was irrelevant. [12C-D, 13F-G] 
F 
G 
H 
3. High Court had overlooked legally possible grounds of interference under 
section 115 C.P.C. 
[14-A-B] 
Balderdas Shiv/al & Anr. v. Fi/mistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd. & Ors. 
[1970] 1 SCR 435; D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. P. Ltd. New Delhi v. 
Sarup Singlt & Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 368; The Managing Direcror !MIG) Hindu-
stan Aero11otics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad & Anr. v. 
Ajit Prnsad 
Tarway, 
Manage,. (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan A eronotic,, Ltd. Balana11ar, Hyder· 
abad, A.LR. 1973 S.C. 76; applied. 
Mis Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Mis Basic Equipment Corpora-
tion [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1060 referred to. 
Dewan Dau/at Ram Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Committee 
& 
Am·. 
ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 363 distinguished. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1202 of 1976. 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 
21st Feb. 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 479 of 
1974. 
F. S. Nariman, B. P. 
Maheshwari and Suresh 
Sethi, 
for thee 
( 
Appellant. 
.M.C. DELHI v. SURESH CHANDRA (Beg, J.) 
11 
Mahendra Narain Advocate of Rajendra Narain & Co., for the 
Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
BEG. J. After issuing a notice to show cause why special leave 
should not be granted, this Court granted, on 13th October, 1976, 
A 
the leave prayed for to appeal agilinst the judgment and order of a 
B. 
learned Judge of the Ddh.i High Court. 
That Court had interfered 
under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, with the concurrent findings 
of the Trail Court and the Appellate Court in this case that, as the 
plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case, no interim injunction 
could be granted to the respondent to restrain the 
appellant, 
the 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi, from realising a sum of Rs. 27,216/-
on account of house tax from the plaintiffs pending the disposal of a c 
suit for a permanent injunction. This Court directed a hearing of this 
appeal on 28th October, 1976. 
Accordingly,, the appeal is 
now 
before us. 
The plaintiff had purchased a house in South Extension, New 
Delhi, on 21st February, 1969, free from all encumberances, de-
mands, or liabilities under the sale deed, and the vendor, Mohan 
Siagh, had undertaken to discharge these dues. 
It was, therefore, 
D 
decided in a previous suit that the defendant-appellant could not 
recover the whole amount sought to be recovered as house tax from 
him. 
The respondent was absolved from liability for the period be-
fore the sale. 
But, the 
plaintiff was liable to pay the tax for the 
period after the purchase. 
He had also paid Rs. 6,992/-. It ap-
pears that proceedings for realisation of dues subsequent to tile pur-
chase had 
then been taken by the 
appellant 
corporation. 
The 
K 
plaintiff's suit for a permanent injunction was brought on the ground 
that t

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