LexMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI versus QIMAT RAI GUPTA & ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
v.
QIMA T RAI GUPTA & ORS.
JULY 27, 2007
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{S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957:
s.126(4)-Assessment order-Period of limitation-Computation of~
C Expression "no amendment under sub-s.(J) shall be made''-Connotation
of-HELD: Jn the context, order would be said to have been made on the date
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the order is signed-A distinction exists in construction of word 'made'
depending upon the question as to whether power was required to be exercised
within period of limitation therefor or in order to provide the person aggrieved
D to avail remedies-Jn construing a provision, as in the instant case, dealing
with /imitation, a liberal interpretation should be given-Interpretation. of
Statutes-Evidence Act, 1872-Presumption.
Words and Phrases:
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"Made" occurring in sub-sec. ( 4) of s.126 of Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957-Connotation of
A notice purported to be u/s 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957 was issued to the respondents in the month of March 1997
proposing to revise the rateable value of their property w.e.f. 1.4. 1996. The
F assessing officer signed the assessment order on 31.3.2000. The order was
communicated to the assesee on 17.4.2000. The assessee-respondents
preferred an appeal in the court of the Additional District Judge on the ground,
inter alia, that the order of assessment was barred by limitation. The appellate
authority held that no amendment in terms of sub-section (1) ofs.126 of the
G Act could be made after lapse of a period of three years from the end of the
year in which notice was given. The Corporation filed a writ petition. The
Single Judge of the High Court directed the appellate authority to determine
the question on merits. In the intra-court appeal filed by the respondents, the
Division Bench of the High Court held that the date of order 'made' in terms
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of s.126(4) of the Act should be taken to be the date when the same was
570
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MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF DELHI v. QIMAT RAI GUPTA
571
communicated to the assessee and not the one when it was signed.
In the appeal filed by the Municipal Corporation, it was contended on
behalf of the appellant that there is a distinction between 'communication' of
the order and making thereof; whereas communication may be net>essary for
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the purpose of filing an appeal, but as regards limitation prescribed for
ma~ing an assessment order, only signing of the order would subserve the B
purpose; and in that view of the matter, the period of thre~ years prescribed
under sub-section (4) of s.126 of the Act being the period of limitati<m, the
expression 'no amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made' should be
given a liberal interpretation.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
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HELD: 1.1. Appellant-Municipal Corporation has a statutory power to
impose property tax. Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,
1957 empowers the Commissioner, who is a statutory authority, to amend the
assessment list in terms of one or the other modes provided for therein. A D
proceeding initiated for the purpose of amending the assessment list is a quasi
judicial one. Indisputably, the Parliament did not intend to confer unbriddled
power on the Commhioner to amend the assessment list. For that purpose
only a period within which the jurisdiction is to be exercised was contemplated,
namely, before the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which the
notice is given, but the same would not mean that the restriction impose~ E
should be given a restricted meaning so as to narrow down the scope there9f
any further. In interpreting a provision dealing with limitation, a liber~I
interpretation in a situation of this nature should be given. The Parliame~t
advisedly chose the word 'made' and not 'communicated'. They, in ordinal}'
parlance, carry different meanings.
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(Paras 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17) (575-C-D; 576-F-H; 577-A, Cl
Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil
Nadu, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 471, relied on.
Raja Harish Chrmdra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer G
and Anr., (1962) 1 SCR 676=AIR (1961) SC 1500, distinguished.
State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, ( 1970) 2 SCR 657=AIR (1970) SC 214;
Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu,
\199'1} Supp. l SCC 471; Surendra Singh and Ors. v. State ofUttar Pradesh,
(1954) SCR 330=AIR (1954) SC 194; K.Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.