MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI versus DHAR MA PROPERTIES PVT. LTD.
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Aยท B c Dยท E F G H [2017] I 2 S.C.R. I 058 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v. DHAR MA PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 8675 of2011) SEPTEMBER 15, 2017 [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.] Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 - s.126 - Notice issued by Corporation for enhancement of rateable value of property - Challenge to - On March 25, 1998, the Corporation issued a notice to the respondent in terms of s.126 of the Act proposing to enhance the rateable value of its properzv, w.ef April 1, 1997 which was received by the respondent on April 4, 1998 - Two issues for consideration - Whether the notice dated March 25, 1998 which was, in fact, received by respondent only on April 4, 1998 was time barred u/s.126 and Whether the assessment order in respect of subseq11ent/ji1t11re period~ could be passed on the basis of the said notice - Held: On the first issue, yes, notice was time barred - The imp11gned notice is time barred as the said notice u/s.126 was served upon the respondent beyond the specified period i.e. on April 4, 1998, even when it was dispatched on March 25, 1998 - Such notice could not form basis to determine the rateable value for the year 1997-98 as the notice was not received in that Assessment Year but was received on~v in the next Assessment Year i.e. 1998-99 - Insofar as second issue is concerned, yes, the assessment order in respect of subsequentlji1t11re periods co11ld be passed on the basis of the said notice - Merely because the notice dated March 25, 1998 was received on April 4, 1998 cannot be ground to defeat the liability to pay the tax - Even if it was not permissible to amend the list w.ef April 1, 1997, at the same time it co11ld always be done w.ef April 1, 1998 as the notice had been received in that Assessment Year, namely, on April 4, 1998 -Assessment carried 0111, which was done within three years from the issuance of notice i.e. the time stijJlllated by sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act was otherwise valid and could be made applicable for subsequent years from April 1, 1998. 1058 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v. DHARMA 1059 PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court A HELD: Whether notice under Section 126 of the Act which was received on April 4, 1998 i.e. after March 31, 1997 would be invalid as beyond the period of limitation prescribed as per Section 126(2) and (4) of the Act? 1.1 Sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 Act mandates giving of notice to the affected persons, of not less than one month period, proposing to make amendment of the assessment list as well as giving an opportunity to such a person to file his objection to the proposed amendment. Section 444 of the Act lays down as to how such notices have to be served. [Para 121 [1067-B-CJ 1.2 Section 444 prescribes the manner in which notices etc. arc required to be served or issued. The High Court has rightly pointed out that four eventualities are contempllltcd in Section 444(1). However, the expression "give" docs not find mention in any of those eventualities. Mandate of Section 126 is "giving of a notice". The question is as to whether at what stage, it would be treated that notice as stipulated in Section 126 has been given. In case of K. Narasimhiah, this Court has held that mere dispatch of notice would not amount to "giving" of notice. "Giving" would be complete only when it has been offered to the concerned person/addressee, even when it is not accepted by him on tendering. Likewise, in Banarsi Debi's case, referring to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which deals with the expressions "serve" or "give" or "sent'', this Court held that all these expressions, namely, "serve", "give" and "sent" are interchangeable terms and, therefore, notice would be treated to have been issued only when the entire process of sending the notice i.e. from dispatch till the service thereof, is complete. [Para 131 [1069-B-D] 1.3 Notice as contemplated under Section 126, was given only on April 4, 1998. Such a notice was clearly not valid for revising the assessment list for the year 1997-98. Reason is obvious and docs not need elaboration. The entire basis of an B c D E F G H 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A B c D E F G H assessment, and in the present case amendment to assessment list, is the issuance of notice. This factor assumes conside
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