MUNICIPAL BOARD OF HARDWAR versus RAGHUBIR SINGH ETC

Citation: [1966] 2 S.C.R. 891 · Decided: 06-12-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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MUNICIPAL BOARD OF HARDWAR 
v. 
RAGHUBIR SINGH ETC. 
December 6, 1965 
[P .. B. 
GAJENDRAGADKAR, 
C.J., K. N. 
WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND 
P. 
SATYANARAYANA 
RAJU, JJ.J 
U.P. Municipalities Act 
(2 of 1916), s. 128(1) (vii) 
and (xiv)-
Scope of. 
In 1941 the appellant-Municipal 
Board 
issued a notification under 
s. 128(1) (xiv) of the U.P. Municipalities Act .. 1916, by which it impos-
ed a toll on motor vehicles and tongas entering or leaving the municipal 
limits with passengers, at the rate of 2 as. per passenger. 
In 1955, a 
second notification was issued under s. 128(1 )(vii) by which the toll was 
increased from 2 as. to 4 as. 
The ·respondents, 
who were owners 
of 
motor vehicles, filed petitions under Art. 226 challenging the toll. There-
after, a third notification was issued under s. 128(l)(xiv) by which the 
description of the toll was amended. A single judge of the High Court 
held that the toll could not be levied on vehicles leaving the municipal 
limits and issued a writ prohibiting the collecting of toll on such vehicles. 
On appeal, a Divisional Bench of the High Court held that toll could also 
be levied on vehicles leaving the municipality, but it could not be levied 
on the same vehicle if the toll had been levied on its .entry into the 
municipality. 
In this Court, it was contended by the appellant that, cl. (xiv) being 
residuary and enabling, brought the full amplitude of the power of the 
State Legislature or levy toll to the aid of cl. (vii), and therefore, accord-
ing to the concept of a toll it could be levied on vehicles both on enter-
ing into and departing from the municipality. 
HELD: Section 128(1) (vii) which enabled the levy of 
toll on a 
vehicle entering the municipality, exhausted all the power delegated by 
the Legislature to the appellant and that power could not be 
extended 
either by the considerations derived from the nature of tolls or from the 
residuary cl. 
(xiv). Therefore, the toll could be collected only from 
vehicles .entering the municipality. 
The distinction made by the Di vi~ 
sional Bench between vehicles which pay toll on entering and which do 
not pay any 
toll till leaving was irrelevant, because the question 
of 
vehicles leaving the munic;pality could not enter the discussion. [897 
B-FJ 
Since the tolls were first imposed in 1941, cl. (xiv) must be viewed 
in the light of the Constitution Act of 1935. The scheme of s. 128 of 
the U.P. Act is that it enumerates certain taxes and confets powers 
on 
municipalities to levy them and then it enacts cl. (xiv) which is intended 
to cover the taxes not enumerated v.lhich the Provincial 
Legislature had 
authority to impose. 
The relevant powers of the Provincial Legislature 
were found in Entries 52 and 53 of the Provincial Legislative List of the 
Constitution Act of 1935. Entry 52 could not be relied on because it 
did not enable the Provincial Legislature to impose taxes on passengers 
carried over inland routes. The power which flowed from Entry 53 was 
made over to the appellant to be exercised in the particular manner stated 
in cl. (vii), that is, on vehicles entering the municipality, and to permit 
the tolls to be levied on v·ehicles leaving the municipality would render 
cl. (vii) ineffective. [895 A-C, E-G, HJ 
892 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1966] 2 S.C.R. 
The power of the State Lei:IBlature derivable from Entries 56 and 59 
A 
of the State List of the Constllution was not available for the second 
notification because, while Entry 56 permitted tax on passengers, the toll 
was not a tax on passengers but on vehicles; and the power to levy tolls 
under Entry 59 continued to be restricted to vehicles entering the munici-
pality. 
Besides, cl. (vii) under which it was issued limited the l'ower 
to vehicles entering the municipality. The third notification was irrele-
vant, as was issued after the petitions were filed. [896 A-CJ 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 311 to 
366 of 1964. 
B 
Appeals from the judgment and decrees dated December 6, 
...11.,.'.-
1957, December 16, 1958, January 29, 1959 of the Allahabad 
-..
High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 343 and 381-416 of 1955, 
548 of 1958 49-55 and 57-67 of 1959 respectively. 
C 
M. C. Setalvad, B. P. !ha and J. P. Goyal, for the appel-
lant. 
G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta and Naunit Lal, for the respondents 
(in C.A.s Nos. 311-366/64). 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Hidayatullah, J.

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