MUKRI GOPALAN versus CHEPPILAT PUTHANPURAYIL ABOOBACKER

Citation: [1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 12-07-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: FAIZAN UDDIN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

cites 9 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

MUKRIGOPALAN 
v. 
CHEPPILAT PUTHANPURA YIL ABOOBACKER 
JULY 12, 1995 
[FAIZAN UDDIN AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] 
Kera/a Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965: Section 18-Ap-
peal-District Judge with the power of Appellate Authority-Whether persona 
designata-Whether delay in filing appeal can be condoned by it-Scope of. 
Limitation Act, 1963-Section 29(2)-Application of-Computing the 
period of limitation under special or local law-If conditions laid down 
satisfied-Procedural scheme contemplated by sections 4 to 24. 
Words & Phrases: 
(i) "Persona Designata''-Meaning of. 
(ii) ''.An Authority as a Court''-Meaning of. 
The Respondent filed eviction petition before Rent Control Court, 
Kannur, under section 11(2)(a) and 11(3) of the Kerala Building (Lease 
& Rent Control) Act, 1965 on the grounds of default in payment of rent 
and bonafide requirement and the Rent Control Court passed an order 
for possession against the appellant. The time for filing appeal elapsed. 
Appellate filed appeal under section 18 of the Act with the application for 
condonation of delay. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal as 
barred by time and obseM'ed that being not a court but a persona desig-
nata it has no power to condone the delay in filing appeal by invoking the 
provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
The order of the appellate authority was confirmed by the High 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Court in Civil Revision Petition. Hence this appeal. 
G 
Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to the Court of the 
r 
Appellate Authority, this Court 
HELD : 1. An authority can be styled to be persona if powers are 
conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be H 
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2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
exercised by anyone else. The scheme of Kerala Rent Act contra indicates 
appellate authority to be a persona designata. The appellate authority 
constituted under Section 18(1) has to decide lis between parties. Such an 
authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district 
having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been ex-
B 
c 
D 
E 
tended. It becomes obvious that even though the concerned District Judge 
might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of 
the District Judge his successor in office can pick up the thread of the 
proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can 
function as an appellate authority under Section 18."If the District Judge 
was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as 
a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present 
case, such a consequence on the scheme of the Act would not follow. 
District Judge appointed as appellate authority under the provisions of 
Kerala Rent Act, they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be 
persona designata. [11-A-D, 12-A] 
Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR (1961) SC 606, 
relied on. 
Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank 
Ltd. & Anr., [1967] 3 SCR 163, relied on. 
Plllthasaradlti Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR (1924) 47 Mad 369, cited. 
2. In order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an 
essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of 
the trapping of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive 
F 
judgment; to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of 
parties in a definitive judgment; to decide the matter on a consideration of 
the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. These are the essential 
trappings to constitute an authority as a court. [12-G, 13-C] 
G 
Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, [1955] 2 SCR 955;Thakur Jugal 
Ki,sltore Sinha v. Sitamarlti Central Coop. Bank Ltd., [1967] 3 SCR 163 and 
Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, [1955] 2 SCR 1013, relied 
on. 
3.1. The following two requirements have to be satisfied by the 
H authority invoking the provisions containing sections 4 to 24 of the Limita-
MUKRIGOPALAN v. C.P.ABOOBACKER 
3 
tion Act: 
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any 
special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. 
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special 
A 
or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule B 
to the Limitation Act. [14-A-B] 
If the aforesaid two requirements are satis

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