MUKHTIAR AHMED ANSARI versus STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI)

Citation: [2005] 3 S.C.R. 797 · Decided: 21-04-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.N. AGRAWAL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

MUKHTIAR AHMED ANSARI 
A 
v. 
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 
APRIL 21, 2005 
[B.N. AGRA WAL AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] 
B 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-Sections 5 
& 20A-Arms Act, 1959-Section 25(/B)-Conviction of appellant for 
consciously possessingfire arms and ammunitions without licence in a"notified 
area"-Conviction under both TADA and the Arms Act-Propriety of-On C 
facts, held, improper-Proceedings under TADA were vitiated since prior 
approval of the District Superintendent of Police under S.20A(J) for recording 
FIR under TADA was not obtained-On merits too, the Designated Court 
erred in passing conviction-It wrongly placed reliance upon facts of a 
kidnapping case in which appellant was already acquitted~Besides, D 
prosecution case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt-Penal Code, 
1860-Sections 364A, 365, 387 rlw 120B. 
Doctrines-Doctrine of "autrefois acquit"-Applicability of 
According to the prosecution, PWl, a businessman kidnapped from E 
Delhi was rescued by the police from Panchkula, Haryana. Appellant, 
the alleged gang leader was nabbed and booked under the Arms Act and 
under TADA. He was separately charged for kidnapping but got acquitted 
on that count. The Designated Court held the Appellant guilty of 
consciously possessing fire-arms and ammunitions without licence in a 
"notified area" and accordingly convicted him under Section 5 of the F 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and 
also under Section 25 (lB) of the Arms Act, 1959. 
In appeal to this Court the <JUestions which arose for consideration 
are whether the proceedings under TADA were vitiated as no prior 
approval in terms of sub-section (I) of Section 20A of TADA was obtained G 
and whether on merits too, the Designated Court erred in convicting the 
--
Appellant. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
797 
H 
798 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
HELD : 1.1. Sub-section (1) of Section 20A of Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, begins with a non-obstante clause 
and declare.; that notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC, no 
information about commission of an offence under TADA "shall be 
recorded by the police without the prior permission of District 
B Superintendent of Police". It is not in dispute that Authority to exercise 
power under sub-section (1) of Section 20A in Delhi is the Deputy 
Commissioner of Police. (806-G-HJ 
1.2. In the instant case, initjally it was alleged by the prosecution. 
that the appellant had committed offences punishable under the Arms 
C Act as well as under the TADA. The Designated Court, however, held 
that the provisions of TADA could not be invoked and hence no charge 
was framed under TADA; The. matter was then taken to this Court by 
the State and the order passed by the Designated Court was set aside. It . 
was only after the order passed by this Court that the proceedings were 
initiated under TADA. For such proceedings, compliance of Section 20A 
D (1) of TADA and prior approval was necessary. (810-E, F] 
1.3. PW 11 had stated in his evidence that after the weapons were 
recovered, seized and sealed, the Deputy Commissioner of Police had 
come on the spot and after satisfying himself, he gave . a direction to 
register a case under TADA against the appellant. However the Deputy 
E Commissioner of Police when himself examined as prosecution witness 
(PW4) did not state that he had given. any such direction to PW 11. On 
the contrary~ he had expressly stated that he had granted sanction in 
writing, bare reading.·of which makes it clear that the Deputy 
Commissioner of Police granted sanction only in respect of an offence 
F punishable under the Arms Act and not under TADA. Therefore, from 
the facts o( me case, it cannot be held that prior approval as required by 
Section 20A (1) has been accorded by the competent authority under 
TADA. All proceedings were, therefore, vitiated. Hence, conviction of the 
appellant under TADA must be set aside. (811-A, C-E] 
G 
Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, [1995) 
5 SCC 302; Mohd. Yunus v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC 459; Kalpnath 
Rai v. State (Through CBI), [1997) 8 SCC 732 and State of A.P. v. A. 
· Sathyanarayana and Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 597, relied on. 
Commissioner of Police v. Gordhands Bhanji, (19521 SCR 135 and 
H Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh v. State of U.P., (1996) 11 SCC 61, referred to. 
MUKHTIARAHMEDANSARI v. STATE(N.C.T. OF DELHI) 

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