[2011) 11 S.C.R. 246
A
MUKHIYA KARYAPALAK ADHIKARI, U. P. KHADI TATHA
GRAMODYOG BOARD KARMIT ANUBHAG, LUCKNOW &
ANR.
v.
SANTOSH KUMAR
B
(Civil Appeal No. 7756 of 2011)
c
SEPTEMBER 08, 2011
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND
ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]
Service Law - Termination - Respondent was working on
contract basis as a Peon - His service was terminated by the
appellant -
Respondent filed writ petition praying for quashing
the termination order -
Single Judge of the High Court
D dismissed the writ petition - Appeal before Division Bench of
High Court - Division Bench admitted the appeal but while
doing so, it stayed the termination order and also specifically
ordered that the respondent be allowed to continue to work -
Held: The Division Bench of High Court while admitting the
E appeal, ought not to have passed an order so as to allow the
F
· appeal itself even at that interim stage - Order passed by the
Division Bench was illegal, without jurisdiction and was passed
without any application of mind - Matter remitted back to
Division Bench of the High Court.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7756 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 09.08.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in Special Appeal No. 1066
G of 2004.
H
R.D. Upadhyay, Dr. Madan Sharma, J.P. Tripathy, Ashay
Upadhyay for the Appellants.
246
MUKHIYAKARYAPALAKADHIKARI, U. P. KHADITATHA
247
GRAMODYOG BOARD KARMIT ANUBHAG, LUCKNOW v.
SANTOSH KUMAR
A.S. Pundir, Anurag Tiwari, Amardeep Dhaka, lrshad
A
Ahmad for the Respondent.
The following order of the Court was delivered
ORDER
B
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties on this appeal who have taken us through the records.
The respondent was engaged on contract basis as a Peon on
C
'Ya lumpsum salary of Rs. 2,500/-on 1.4.2003. Subsequently, an
, 6rder came to be passed against the respondent on 26.6.2004.
By the aforesaid order, the contract service of the respondent
was terminated w.e.f. 5. 7.2004.
3. The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid order
D
of termination filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
which was registered as 28789 of 2004. In the said writ petition
filed by the respondent, a prayer was made for quashing the
order dated 26.6.2004 terminating the service of the
respondent. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ
E
petition passed an order on 28.7.2004 dismissing the said writ
petition holding that the engagement of the respondent on
contract basis did not vest on him any legal right to regular
appointment.
F
4. The High Court passed an order in the said appeal
which was filed in 2004 which was registered as Special
Appeal No. 1066 of 2004. The appeal was listed before the
Division Bench nearly six years of passing of the order of the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench passed the order
G
for admitting the appeal. But peculiarly enough the High Court
' passed an order that the order dated 26.6.2004 passed by the
appellant terminating the service would remain stayed. It was
also made specific in that order that the respondent should be
allowed to continue to work.
H
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 11 S.C.R.
A
5. We fail to understand as to how the Division Bench while
admitting an appeal could pass such an order so- as to allow
the appeal itself even at that interim stage. The respondent was
not working when the suit was filed and his writ petition was
dismissed. Despite the said fact not only the Division bench
B stayed the operation of the order after six years of filing the
appeal, but directed for allowing the respondent to continue to
work despite the fact that he was not working on that date.
6. Therefore, the aforesaid order passed by the Division
Bench is illegal, without jurisdiction and was passed without any
C application of mind. We set aside the said order and remit back
the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court for disposal
of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. The order dated
9.8.2010 passed by the Division Bench staying the order dated
26.6.2004 and directing the appellant to allow the respondent
D to continue to work stand quashed and would not operate in
any manner till the disposal of the appeal.
E
7. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent in terms
of the aforesaid order.
B.B.B.
Appeal allowed.
Lex