MUKESHBHAI GOPALBHAI BAROT versus STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [2010] 9 S.C.R. 632 · Decided: 04-08-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: H.S. BEDI, C.K. PRASAD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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B 
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[2010] 9 S.C.R. 632 
MUKESHBHAI GOPALBHAI BAROT 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
(Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2010) 
AUGUST 4, 2010 
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND CHANDRAMAULI KR. 
PRASAD, JJ.] 
' 
Penal Code, 1860: 
s. 302 and s. 3 (2) (v) of Attrocities Act - Death of a 
married Scheduled Caste woman by burn injuries - Three 
dying declarations recorded by Magistrate, the police official 
and the husband of the victim, respectively - Prosecution of 
D accused, an Advocate and family friend, on the basis of the 
dying declaration recorded by husband of deceased -
Acquittal by trial court - Conviction by High Court - HELD: 
High Court erred in holding that the first two dying 
declarations had no evidentiary value - A bare perusal of 
E sub-s.(2) of s.162 CrPC when read with s.32 of Evidence Act 
would reveal that a statement of a person recorded uls 161 
CrPC would be treated as a dying declaration after his death 
- In this view of the matter, the first dying declaration made 
to the Magistrate would, in fact, be the First Information Report 
in this case - The first two dying declarations completely 
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exonerated the accused from wrong doing, and attributed the 
bum injuries to an accident - There is nothing on record which 
could indicate that the accused was present at that time - Even 
more significant is the second dying declaration recorded by 
the Police Officer in the presence of the brother and the 
G husband of the deceased and they had attested this 
document as well - On the contrary, the third dying declaration 
is obviously suspicious, as the manner in which it has been 
written, and the flow of words indicate that this could not be 
H 
632 
MUKESHBHAI GOPALBHAI BAROT v. STATE OF 
633 
GUJARAT 
the statement of a person who was on the verge of death -
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Besides, it was written on 17-9-1993 and the complaint was 
filed on 26-9~ 1993 on which date the husband of the deceased 
also mal;ie an application to the Government seeking 
compensation on the death of his wife being a Scheduled 
Caste and was entitled to compensation on that account - The 
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compensation has since been taken - The two letters relied 
upon by the High Court do not, in any way, advance the case 
of the prosecution and on the contrary they indicate that the 
a/legation of an attempted rape of the deceased by the 
accused, whom he regarded as his sister, was a story created c 
long after the incident by the husband in order to take 
compensation - There is absolutely no evidence of homicide 
in this case - Accordingly, the trial court has correctly 
recorded the findings that the deceased suffered an accidental 
death - The judgment of High Court is set aside - Appeal 0 
against acquittal -
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1989 - s.3(2)(v). 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
Appeal against acquittal - HELD: It has repea,tedly been E 
held that interference by High Court in an appeal against 
acquittal should be minimal and only in cases where the trial 
court judgment is perverse or does not flow from the evidence 
-
in the instant case, the judgment of High Court has 
completely ignored this basic principle - The judgment of trial 
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court based on a correct appreciation of the evidence, was 
completely in accordance with law and did not warrant 
interference by High Court. 
CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No. 15 of 2010. 
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From the Judgment & Order dated 08.09.2009 of the High 
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 
1998. 
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634 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
Maganbhai Barot, E.C. Agrawala, Nakul Mohta, Mahesh 
Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala for the Appellant. 
Ninad Laud, Jesal, Hemantika Wahi for the Respondent. 
B 
The following order of the Court was delivered 
ORDER 
The facts leading to this appeal are as under: 
1. The appellant accused, a lawyer by profession, was 
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residing in Kaloi, District Mahesana whereas Kamlaben Ratilal 
Parmar, wife of Ratilal Hemabhai Paramar PW-7, deceased 
was residing along with her family at Mahesana and was 
serving as a Mid-wife at the Primary Health Centre in village 
Vamaj, Taluka Kadi, District Mahesana. Kamlaben had also 
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been allotted a residential quarter in village Vamaj. The 
appellant was known to the family of the deceased as she had 
appointed him as an advocate to represent her in a 
departmental enquiry. On the 14th September 1993 the 
deceased, as per her routine, left for village Vamaj 

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