MUKESH KUMAR AGGARWAL & ORS. versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

Citation: [1988] 2 S.C.R. 501 · Decided: 18-12-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. NATARAJAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

MUKESH KUMAR AGGARWAL & ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. 
DECEMBER 18, 1987 
[S. NATARAJAN AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.) 
Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958: Schedule II Part 
II Entry 32A and Part V, Entry 12-Stacks of 'Eucalyptus wood' sold 
b forest department after separating the 'Ba/lies' and 'Poles'-Whether 
Timber' or 'firewood'-Liability for sales-Tax. 
Words and Phrases-Timer' -'Fire' -wood'-Meaning of. 
The Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh sold to the appellants, 
A 
B 
c 
' 
who are dealers in timber, stacks of "eucalyptns-wood" after separat-
ing the "Ballies" and "poles". Sales tax at the rate of 16% ad-valorem 
leviable on the sale of 'timber' under Entry 32A of part II of Schednle 
.. 
II of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, was sought to D 
be recovered from the appellants on the gronnds that what was sold 
was 'timber'. The levy was challenged by the appellants in the High 
Court of Madhya Pradesh. 
-_,.-
The High Court rejected the appellants' contention that what was 
sold, being left-overs after the extraction of "poles" and "Ballies", E 
was merely 'lire-wood' within the meaning of and attracting entry No. 
,.,. t 12 of Part V of Schedule II of the Act and thus liable to sales tax only at 
.the rate of 3%. The High Court upheld the levy on the view that the 
"-i: 2oods we,re 'Timber' and attracted entry 32A of Part II. The High 
'tourt took the view that where the wood was not, in the normally 
)" 
accepted commercial practice, lire wood, and more especially, where F 
the wood was sold and purchased subject to specifications which 
condnce the wood to particular purposes other than fuel, the goods sold 
cannot be regarded as firewood. 
The appellants' contentions reiterated before this Court were (l) 
that what was sold were the left-overs and remnants, (2) that the forest 
department had itself described the goods in the tender notice as 'lire G 
~ wood heaps', (3) that the wood-stacks could, by no stretch of imagina-
tion, be held to answer the well-known concept of 'Timber', and (4) 
that the wood sold was 'lire-wood' or at all events, plain 'wood' not 
amounting to 'Timber' or 'firewood' in which case it fell within the 
residuary entry. 
501 
H 
502 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988) 2 .S.C.R. 
A 
The respondents, on the other hand, urged that the 'wood' sold 
did not admit of being described as 'fire-wood' because nobody used 
encalypt_us wood as fire-wood due to its very high cost. 
B 
Allowing the appeal in part and remitting the matter to the High 
Court it was, 
HELD: ( l) The finding of the High Court that the goods was 
'Timber' appears to have been reached as necessary consequence and 
logical corollory of the goods not being 'fire-wood'. If the wood is ~ot 
"fire-wood" it need not necessarily and for that reason alone -ht 
'Timber'. All wood is not timber as, indeed, all wood is not 'fire-wood' 
C either though perhaps it may not be incorrect to say that both 'fire-
wood' and 'Timber' are 'wood' in its generic sense. [SOSC) 
D 
(2) All parts of portions of even a timber tree need not necessarily 
be 'Timber'. Some parts are timber~ some parts merely 'fire-wood', 
and yet others merely 'wood'. [509F) 
(3) In a taxing statute words which are not technical expressions 
or words of art, but are words of everyday use, must be understood and 
given a meaning, not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense 
as understood •n common parlance i.e. "that sense which people 
conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, 
E 
would attribute to it." Such words must be understood in their popular 
sense. [505B-C) 
(4) The use to which the 'goods' are capable of being put is not 
determinative of the nature of the goods; nor even the nomenclature of
1 
the goods as given by the authorities is determinative. The fact that th~ 
F 
purchasers were dealers in timber is also not conclusive. (508G I 
(5) The expression 'Timber' has an accepted and well-recognised 
legal connotation and is nomen-juris. It has also a popular meaning as a 
word of everyday use. In its popular sense, 'timber' is understood to be 
'imarathi-Lakdi'. In a popular-sense 'Timber' has certain association 
G 
of ideas: as to its size, stability, utility, durability, the unit of meas-
ure of quantity and of valuation etc. [505D; 507A] 
( 6) Having regard· to the size, nature and description ofthe wood 
in the present case, the 'wood-heaps' were not susceptible to be or

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