MST. RUKHMABAI versus LALA LAXMINARAYAN AND OTHERS

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 253 · Decided: 17-11-1959 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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S.C.R., 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
MST. RUKHMABAI 
v. 
. 
LALA LAXMINARAYAN AND OTHERS 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and 
J. c. SHAH, JJ.) 
253 
Hindu Law-Joint family-Partition-Admissions of members 
accepting partition, value of-New point-When can be allowed to be 
raised-Suit for declaration of deed as sham- -Right to sue, when 
accrues-Limitation-Specific Relief Act, r877, (I of r877), s. 42-
Indian Limitation Act, r908 (lX ofr908), Sch. I, art. rzo. 
A joint Hindu family which was heavily indebted owned 
extensive properties and business. In 1915 certain members of 
the family including one Govindprasad executed a registered 
deed of relinquishment in favour of another member. The deed 
recited that the members of the family had become separated in 
1898, by a deed of relinquishment which was not registered and 
so a fresh one was being executed confirming the earlier arrange-
ment. On February 17, 1916, Govindprasad executed a trust 
deed in favour of two minors, Chandanlal, a son of one of his 
brothers and Rukhmabai, a daughter of another brother. The 
trust was created in a sum of Rs. 15,000 for constructing a building 
or buying land therewith and paying the net income from it to 
the two beneficiaries in equal shares. With a part of. this money 
a site was purchased and a ,building was constructed thereon. On 
October 25, 1929, Rukhmabai filed a suit against Chandanlal for 
partition of the said property and obtained a decree. When the 
Commissioner appointed by the Court went to effect the partition 
on February 13, 1937, the respondent, who is a brother of 
Chandanlal, obstructed him, and, on October 8, 1940, he filed a 
suit for a declaration that the trust deed executed by Govind-
prasad was a sham document and that the property was joint 
family property. Apart from oral and documentary evidence the• 
appellant relied also upon certain admissions made by .members 
of the family accepting the partition. The Court dismissed the 
suit holding that Govindprasad had become separated in 1898, 
that the trust deed was genuine and that the trust money was 
his self-acquired property. In.the appeal before the High Court 
by the respondent the appellant raised two new pleas, namely, 
(i) that the suit for a mere declaration was barred by s. 42 of the 
Specific Relief Act and (ii) that the suit was barred by limitation 
under art. 120 of the Limitation Act as it was not filed within 
six years of the knowledge of the respondent of the fraudulent 
nature of the transactions which he had in 1917, or at least in 
1929, when the appellant filed her ~uit for partition. The High 
Court rejected both these contentions, held that the two relin-
quishment deeds and the deed of trust were sham documents 
and set aside the decree of the trial court and decreed the 
3~ 
•
November I7 
254 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] 
, 959 
respondent's suit. The appellant obtained a certificate and 
appealed. 
Rukkmabai 
Held, that the documents in question were sham documents, 
v. 
that the property in suit was joint family property and that the 
Lala Laxminarayan suit had been rightly decreed. 
· 
•nd Others 
The admissions made by one or other members of the family 
to meet particular contingencies or to get an advantage were not 
of much value in determining the question whether some of the 
members of the joint Hindu family had separated. Persons some-
times made statements which served their purpose, or proceeded 
upon ignorance of the true position; and it was not their state-
ments but their relations, with the estate, which should be taken 
in to consideration in determining the issue. 
Alluri Venkatapathi Raju v. Dantulttri Venkatanarasimha 
Raju, (r935-36) L.R. 63 I.A. 397, relied on. 
The new point raised by the appellant that the suit was 
barred by s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act could not be allowed to 
be raised as it was not raised in the trial Court. If the point had 
been raised at the earliest stage the respondent could have asked 
for the necessary amendment to comply with the provisions of 
s. 42. It was a well settled rule of practice not to dismiss suits 
automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make the necessary 
amendment if he sought to do so. 
But the new point of limita-
tion could be allowed to be raised in appeal as even if it had been 
raised at the earliest stage the respondent could not have pleaded 
or proved any new facts to meet the point. 
The suit was not barred by limitat

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