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MST. RAMRATI KUER versus DWARIKA PRASAD SINGH AND ORS.

Citation: [1967] 1 S.C.R. 153 · Decided: 24-08-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. WANCHOO · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
MST. RAMRATI KUER 
v. 
DW ARIKA PRASAD SINGH AND ORS. 
August 24, 1966 
[K. N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND R. S. 
BACHAWAT, JJ.] 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), ss. 32, 158-Deponent's ad-
mission againsit his interest--Conscious knowledge, if necessary-Later 
statement to ccmtradict, relevancy. 
The appellant's mother executed a gift deed in favour of the appel-
lant claiming that she inherited the property in 1920 on the death of her 
husband, who had inherited it from her father-in-law. 
The respondents 
claiming title to the property filed a suit challenging the gift doeed on the 
ground that the father-in-law of the dono< (mother) had survived the 
husband and therefore she could not have inherited the property under 
the Hindu Law as then pre.vailing. For this purpose the respondents relied 
'Upon a statement, that the father-in-law had survived the husband, made by 
the donor in a mortgage suit in 1925, to establish her case. When 
this statement was made there was no dispute in the faimly. 
On the 
questions whether, (i) this statement in the mortgage suit \vas admissible 
in evidence and (ii) the statement made by the donor in the gift deed 
was admissibk~ to contradict the statement she made in the mortgage suit. 
HELD: (i) This st~tement in the mortgage suit, which was againat 
proprietary interest of the mother would be admi-s~de in evidence under 
s. 32(3) of the Evidence Act, "8 she was dead. 
It could not be 
an 
admission, so far the appellant was 
concerned, but it would 
certainly 
be a piece of eviden~e to be taken into considerati-:>n. 
The admissibility of statements under s. 32(3) of the Evidence Act 
does not arise unless the party knows the statement to be against his 
interest. 
But the question whether the statement .was madoe consciously 
with the knowledge that it was against the interest of the person making 
it would be a question of fact in each case and would depend in most 
cases on the circumstances in which the statement was made. [l 58 F-G; 
159 A-Bl 
Srlma!I Savltrl Debi v. Raman Bljoy, L.R. (1949) LXXVI I.A. 255, 
Tucker v. O/dburry Urban District Council, L.R. [l912] 2 K.B. 317 and 
Ward v. H. S. Pitt [1913] 2 K.B. 
130, relied on. 
The statement W. question was made by the mother consciously and 
not at thΒ·e instance of any one and she must, in the circumstances of 
the case, be presumed to know that the statement was against her pro-
prietary in.terest, for thereby she became the widow of the predeceased 
son of her father-in-law. [159 G] 
(ii) Assuming that the statements in the gift dead would be admissible 
under s. HS of the Evidence Act the statement made in the mortgage 
suit in 1925 carries greater weight as it was made at a time when there 
was no dispute in. the family, [160 E-FJ 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 981 of 1964. 
Ml4Sup. CI/66-11 
SUPRRMI! COURT RBPOllTS 
[1967] I s.c.R. 
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 
A 
22, 1961 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree 
No. 223 of 1957. 
Bishan Narain aRd U. P. Singh, for the appellant. 
Sarjoo Prasad, B. K. Saran, A. B. S. Sinha, S. K. Mehta and 
K. L. Mehta for respondent No. 2. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Wancboo, J. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by 
the Patna High Court. A suit was brought by the plaintiffi-res-
pondents for a declaration, and in the alternative for possession, 
in respect of certain properties. It was prayed that a deed of 
gift executed on July 31, 1953 by Mst. Phuljhari Kuer in favour 
of the appellant Ramrati Kuer was not binding on the plaintiffs-
respondents. Mst. Phuljhari Kuer was originally a defendant 
but died during the pendency of the suit. The case of the respondents 
was that the common ancestor of the parties Ramcharan Singh 
bad three sons, namely, Ramruch, Uttim Narain and Basekhi 
Singh. After the death of Ramcharan Singh, his three sons sepa-
rated in status though the properties were not divided by metes and 
bounds. Uttim Narain died sometime before 1900 leaving a widow 
Mst. Zira Kuer but no children, and Mst. Zira Kuer in her turn 
died in 1943. 
Ramruch had a son Basudeo Narain. According 
to the respondents, Basudeo Narain died during the life-time of 
his father sometime about the revisional settlement which took 
place between 1917-1920. As Basudeo Narain was the only son 
of Ramruch the latter was greatly grieved on his premature death 
and he left bis home about a m

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