MRS. VEEDA MENEZES versus YUSUF KHAN AND ANR.

Citation: [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 123 · Decided: 31-03-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. WANCHOO · Disposal: Dismissed
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case
Judgment (excerpt)

• 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
MRS. VEEDA MENEZES 
v. 
YUSUF KHAN AND ANR. 
March 31, 1966 
[K. N. WANCHOO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.] 
Indian Penal Code, s. 95-Harm caused whether must be acci-
dental to come within General Exception-Physical injury whether 
altogether outside pur11iew of section. 
In the course of an altercation between neighbours the first res-
pondent slapped the appellant's servant and threw a file of papers 
at the appellant's husband which missed him but hit the appellant 
on the elbow, causing a scratch. On a prosecution being launched 
the Presidency Magistrate convicted the first respondent under s. 
323 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court however held that the 
offending act came within the General Exception in s. 95 of the 
Indian Penal Code as it was trivial. In appeal to this Court the ap-
pellant contended that: (1) Section 95 applies only when the act of 
the accused is accidental and not deliberate; (2) the section cannot 
be invoked if the harm caused consists of physical injury, 
HELD: (i) It cannot be said that harm caused by doing an act 
with intent to cause harm or with the knowledge that harm may be 
caused thereby will not fall within the terms of s. 95. The section 
applies if the act causes harm or is intended to cause harm or is 
known to be likely to cause harm, provided the harm is so slight 
that no person of ordinary sense or temper would complain of such 
harm. [125 F] 
(ii) There is nothing in s. 95 to justify the contention that the 
word 'harm' as used in that section does not include physical injury. 
Section 95 is a general exception and that word has in many other 
sections dealing with general exceptionsi a wide connotation inclu~ 
sive of physical injury. There is no reason to suppose that the Legis-
lature intended to use the expression 'harm' in s. 95 in a restricted 
sense. [126 A-B] 
F 
(iii) Whether an offence is trivial must depend on the nature of 
the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention 
• 
with which the offending act is done, and other related matters. 
[126 C-D] 
G 
H 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Appeal No. 
209 of 
1964. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
January 31, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision 
Application No. 913 of 1963. 
J. C. Dalal, E. E. Jhirad and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant. 
S. C. Patwardhan B. Dutta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. 0. Mathur 
and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. I. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Shah, J. The appellant, Mrs. Menezes, is the owner of a 
123 
124 
~t.:PREMll! COURT RF.POHTS 
(1966] BUPP. S.CR. 
house in Bombay, and the wife of the first respondent Yusuf Khan 
is a tenant of a part of the first floor in that house. On January 17, 
1963 one Robert- a servant of the appellant. called the wife of 
A 
the first respondent a thief and 'l/a/kar'. On the next day the first 
respondent slapped the face of Robert. This was followed by a 
heated exchange of abusive words between the first 
respondent 
and the appellant's husband. The first respondent was annoyed B 
and threw at the appellant's husband a "file" of papers. The file 
did not hit the appellant's husband, but it hit the elbow of the 
appellant causing a "scratch". The appellant lodged information 
at the Sandra police station complaining that the first respondent 
had committed house trespass in order to the committing of an1 
offence punishable with imprisonment, had thrown a shoe at her, C 
had slapped the face of her servant Robert, and had also caused 
her a "bleeding incised wound on the forearm". The version of the 
appellant was -a gross exaggeration of the incident. The Officer in 
charge of the police station was persuaded to enter upon an in· 
vestigation on this information, which by charging the respondent 
with the offence of trespass was made to appear as if a cognizable 
offence was committed. The Sub-Inspector found that the appellant D 
had suffered a mere scratch on her elbow. The appellant and 
Robert declined to go to a public hospital for examination or treat· 
ment, and were, it is claimed, examined by a private medical prac-
titioner, who certified that the appellant had suffered a "bleeding 
incised wound, skin deep, size I" in length on the right forearm", 
and that Robert had "a swelling about Ii'' in diameter, roundish, 
soft and tender", hut no bruises. 
The offence was petty, but was given undue importance. The 
case was transferred from the
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.