MRS. M. N. CLUBWALA AND ANR. versus FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS.

Citation: [1964] 6 S.C.R. 642 · Decided: 03-02-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
1964 
paLy, for a "factory" is something very different from a 
Sllyam Behari 
"company" _and may belong to a company or to Govern-
&.I• 0;" Madhya ment or to a local. body or even to an individual. The mere 
Pradesh 
fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was 
Wanchoo J. 
for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected 
therewith cannot therefore lead to the inference that the 
acquisition was for a company. It follows that when the 
two notifications declared that the land was needed for a 
public purpose in a case where no part of the compensation 
was .to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled 
or managed by a local authority, they were invalid in view 
of the proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act. 
All proceedings 
following on such notifications would be of no effect under 
the Act. 
1964 
February, 3 
We therefore allow -the appeal and set aside the order 
of the High Court and quash the notifications under s. 6 of 
the Act and restrain the respondents from taking any steps 
towards the acquisition of the land notified thereunder. As 
however the point on which the appellants have succeeded 
was not specifically taken in the writ petition, we direct the 
parties to bear their own costs throughout. 
Appeal allowed. 
MRS. M. N. CLUBW ALA AND ANR. 
v. 
FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS. 
(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.) 
Licence or Lease-Provision requiring notice to vacate-If inconsistent 
with licence-Intention of parties-To be ascertained from Agree· 
ment-lnference from circumstance.! and conduct, if formdl docu-
ment absent-Exclusive possession if conclusive evidence of lease. 
In disputes regarding extra fees in respect of meet-stalls in a private 
market owned by the appellants, the respondents-~tall-holders filed a sujt 
alleging that the relationship between them and the appellants was that of 
lessees and lessors; while according to the appellants, the respondents 
6 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
were only their licensees. 
The stall-holders have been executing agree-
ments, signed by the stall-holders alone, in which the payment is styled as 
rent. Though the building in which the market is located is owned by 
the appellants it could not be used as a market for the sale of meat or 
comestibles without the permission of the municipal council, and a number 
of duties have been imposed upon the owners including that of closing 
the market and tha.t market functioned only \Vi thin 
~he stated hours. 
The City Civil Court Judge finding that the respondents were bare licen-
sees dismissed their suit. His decision was affirmed in appeal. On a fur-
ther appt:JI the High Court reversed the findings of the c:ourts below 
holding that from the general tenor of the document the terms created 
onJy a tenancy in respect of the stalls and not a 
mere licence or per-
missive occupation saying that if the occupation of the stall-holders was 
only permissive the condition as to the payment of rent, eviction for de-
fault in payment of rent for more than 3 days, the provision for annual 
repairs being carried out by the landlord, the further provision that repaii" 
that might be occasioned by the carelessness of the respondents should 
be carried out at their expense and the adequate provision for 30 days 
notice for vacating the stalls if they were required by the landlord would 
all seem to be inconsistent and irrelevant. On appeal by !<pecial leave: 
Held: (i) While it is true that the essence of a licence is that it i1 
revocable at the will of the granter the provision in the licence that the 
licensee would be entitled to a notice before being required to vacate is 
not inconsistent with a licence, and the mere necessity of giving such a 
notice would not indicate that the transaction was a lea.1:;e. 
Whether an agreement creates between the part;es the relationship of 
landlord and tenant or me1ely that of licensor and licensee the decisive 
consideration is the intention of the parties, which has to be :.t!)cert::iined 
on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In 
the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties 
must be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties. 
(ii) The fact that a person has exclusive possession is not conclusive 
evidence of bis being a lessee. If, however, exclusive possession to which 
a person is entitled under an agreement with a landlord is coupled with 
an interest i

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