LexMRINAL DAS & ORS. versus THE STATE OF TRIPURA
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[2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 411 MRINAL DAS & ORS. V. THE STATE OF TRIPURA (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1994 OF 2009) SEPTEMBER 05, 2011 [P. SATHASIVAM AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 rlw s.34 - Murder - 13 accused- Prayer of A-12 for grant of 'pardon' and to treat him A . B as an 'approver' allowed by trial court - Disclosure made by C approver (A-12), who was examined as PW-6 - Trial Court convicted A-5 and A-11 u/s.302 but acquitted the remaining ten accused - On appeal, High Court set aside acquittal of A-4, A-7, A-9 and A-1 and convicted them u/ss. 302134 and also affirmed conviction of A-5 & A-11 uls.302 - Justification D of - Held: Justified - The statement of approver (PW-6) was confidence inspiring and as rightly pointed out by the High Court, there was nothing wrong in accepting his entire statement - The analysis of statement of various persons, particularly, eye-witnesses clearly strengthen the case of PW- E 6, approver, in all aspects including conspiracy, planning to attack the deceased for his statement about the students' movement, actual incident, role played by the assailants and subsequent events after the gunshot till the death of the deceased -As rightly observed by the trial Court and the High F Court, the ocular evidence of the approver (PW-6) stood corroborated by the medical evidence of PW-14 (the doctor who conducted post mortem) and the post. mortem examination report (Ex. 7) - There was common intention among the accused persons including the six persons G 1 identified by the eye-witnesses - High Court was right in applying s.34 and basing·conviction of six accused persons i.e. A-5, A-11, A-9, A-7, A-4 and A-1. Evidence Act, 1872- s.133 r/w Illustration (b) to s .. 114 - 411 H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Evidentiary value of "approver" and its acceptability with or without corroboration - Held: Though a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver, yet the universal practice is not to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated B in material particulars - Insistence upon corroboration is based on the rule of caution and is not merely a rule of law - Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. c Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Power to direct tender of pardon - Held: The principle of tendering pardon to an accomplice is to unravel the truth in a grave offence so that guilt of the other accused persons concerned D in commission of crime could be brought home - An accomplice who has been granted pardon uls.306 or s.307 of the Code gets protection from prosecution - When he is called as a witness for the prosecution, he must comply with the condition of making a full and true disclosure of the whole E of the circumstances within his knowledge concerning the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and if he suppresses anything material and essential within his knowledge concerning the commission of crime or fails or F refuses to comply with the condition on which the tender was made and the Public Prosecutor gives his certificate uls.308 of the Code to that effect, the protection given to him can be lifted - Once an accused is granted pardon u/s. 306, he ceases to be an accused and becomes witness for the G prosecution. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Delay in tendering pardon - Effect of - Held: Pardon can be tendered H at any time after commitment of a case but before the MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 413 judgment is pronounced - In the instant case, the approver - A PW-6, submitted his application to become an approver on 16.06.2004 well before the judgment which was delivered on 19.04.2005 - In view of the same, the contention regarding delay on the part of PW-6 is liable to be rejected - Regarding his change of mind, PW-6 asserted that he had decided to B disc!Ose the whole incident voluntarily on the advise of the members of his family - In er.ass-examination, PW-6 explained that since 31.08.2000 (the incident date) till mid of March, 2004, he had been running amok and during the said intervening period,
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