MR. RAJEEV NOHWAR versus CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY MAHARASHTRA STATE, PUNE AND OTHERS
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A B C D E F G H 623 MR. RAJEEV NOHWAR v. CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY MAHARASHTRA STATE, PUNE AND OTHERS (Civil Appeal No. 5970 of 2021) SEPTEMBER 24, 2021 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 β ss. 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 52A, 53(1A) β Stamp Duty β Refund of β The appellant booked a residential flat β He purchased e-SBTR stamp paper for amount of Rs.8,44,500/- β Dispute arose with the builder β Appellant filed consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) β Complaint was allowed β The developer refunded the entire consideration β Appellant claimed refund of stamp duty β The said claim was rejected by the Deputy Inspector of Registration on the ground that the application for refund was not made within six months as mandated by s.48(3) of 1958 Act β The High Court affirmed the view of the Revenue Authorities that the application for refund was barred by limitation β On appeal, held: Revenue Authorities rejected the application on the ground that the application was not filed within six months, treating the case to fall within the residuary provision in s.48 of the Act β What this view missed is, if the application for refund is not with reference to the provisions of s.47, the period of limitation in s.48 clearly has no application β Since the application of the appellant does not fall within the purview of s.47, the six month limitation period prescribed in s.48 would not be applicable β The application filed by the appellant does not fall within the ambit of ss.47, 52 and 52A β Appellantβs application for refund was titled with reference to the provisions of s.47 β It is well settled that a reference of a wrong statutory provision, cannot oust the citizen of an entitlement to refund which otherwise follows in terms of a statutory provision β In the instant case, the stamp paper was purchased bona fide, and the conduct of the appellant was not unreasonable nor was there any intentional or wanton delay β As a [2021] 10 S.C.R. 623 623 A B C D E F G H 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 10 S.C.R. general rule of law, the right to refund is a statutory creation β A refund can be sought in terms envisaged by statute β The case of the appellant is not specifically barred by any substantive provision β In the case of an eventuality such as the instant case where the facts of the case are not covered by the statute, the Supreme Court u/Art.142 will have the power to condone delay β Since the delay in filling the application for refund in the instant case was due to the prolonged proceedings before the NCDRC, the application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay β As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to a refund of stamp duty which was paid at the time of purchase of the e-stamp paper, conditional on the appellant returning the e-stamp paper to the collector of stamps. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Section 48 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 begins with the statement that the application for relief under Section 47 shall be made within the periods which are indicated in clauses (1), (2) and (3). In other words, the periods of limitation which are prescribed in clauses (1), (2) and (3) are in respect of those cases which are governed by Section 47. The revenue authorities rejected the application filed by the appellant on the ground that the application was not filed within six months from the date of the purchase of the stamp paper, treating the case to fall within the residuary provision in Section 48 of the Act. This view has been accepted by the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. What this view misses is that Section 48 in its entirety applies only to those cases where the application for relief is governed by Section 47. If the application for refund is not with reference to the provisions of Section 47, the period of limitation in Section 48 clearly has no application. Since the application of the appellant does not fall within the purview of any of the clauses in Section 47, the 6 month limitation period prescribed in Section 48 would not be applicable to the application for allowance filed by the appellant. [Paras 17 and 18][634-E-H; 635-A-B] 2. The application filed by the appellant did not fall within the ambit of Sections 47, 52 and 52A. It is true that the application for refund was titled with reference to the provisions of Section 47. But, it is well settled that a reference of a wrong statutory A B
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