MOTIRAM GHELABHAI (DEAD) THROUGH L. R. MANIRAM MOTIRAM versus JAGAN NAGAR (DEAD) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS.
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: โข MOTIRAM GHELABHAI <DEAD) THROUGH L. R. MANIRAM MOTIRAM v. lOSl JAGAN NAGAR (DEAD) THROUGH LRs AND OTHERS. February 28, 1985 [V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND V. KHALID, JJ.] Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Section 50 Suit for possession under Transfer of Property Act-Decreed for possession-Appeal filed and pending-Part II of the Act made applicable to area where suit premises situated-Appellant whether entitled to protection of 1947 Act-Effect of proviso para 2 to ~ectfon 50 explained. The respondents-plaintiffs gave a lease of an open plot to the appelยท !ant-defendant for a period of 10 years for tbe purposCJ of running a flour mill after making necessary construction thereon at a yearly rent. In the lease-deed there was a clause for the renewal of the term, and also that if it was not renewed, the lessors were given the right to recover vacant possession on removal of construction at tbe expiry of the initial term. There was llO renewal of the term on the expiry of 10 years lease period and the appellaot.defeodaot was permitted to bold-over. Later by a notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the respondent called upon the appellant-defendant to vacate and band-over vacant possession As the notice was not complied with a suit in ejectment was filed against the appellant-defendant The trial court negatived all the defeocee that were raised by the appellant-defendant and decreed the suit for ejectmeot in favour of the respondents-plain tiff's. The appellant-defendant challenged the decres by an appeal to the District Court and wbile the appeal was pending the State by a Notification dated 26th March, 1980 applied Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 to the village where the suit premises were situJted. The appellant-defendant with the permission of the court raised the contention in the appeal tbat he was enlitled to tho protect ion of Part II of the Act and since none of the grounds on which eviction could have been made under Part II had been made out by the respondents-plaintiffs they were not entitled to recover possession. This contention was refuted on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs on the ground that in view of the proviso to s. 50 of the Act and particularly the latter port thereof Part II of the Act bad no retrospective operation so far as A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G 1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R pending appeals were concerned and such appeals had to be disposed of as if Part 11 of the Act \Vas not arplicable. The Assbtant Judge took the view that the proviso to s. 50 read with the latter part thereof expressly enacted that pending appeals arising out of decrees or orders passed before the coming into operation of the Act had to be dispossed of as if the Act had not been passed and therefore the appellant.defendant was not entitled to any protection as claimed by him and the respondents-plaintiffs were entitled to the decree for possession and dismissed the appeal. ยท. The second appeal of the appellant-defendant to the High Court was _. summarily dismissed. In the appeal to this Court on the question: whether a pending appeal would be governed by the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and LCldgiog House Rates (Control) Act, 194 7 upon the Part II of the Act being made appli- cable io the area in which the suit premises were situated during its pondency. Di1missiog the Appeal, HELD : 1. Having regard to the two decisions in Chandrasfngh Manibhai and others v. Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chhaabda and others, [ 1951] 2 SCR 221 and Shah Bhojraj Kuverji' Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yogro} Sinha, [1962] 2 SCR 159 it is ciear that sub-secs. (2) and (3) of s. 12 are prospective but sub-sec. (1) thereof is retrospective io operation. [IOS6B] 2. By the Bombay Act 3 of 1949 three changes wero made by the legislature, (i) it deleted the words "other than execution proceedings and appeals" appearing in brackets from the proviso and inserted a new para- graph at the end of that proviso dealing separately with execution ptocee- diogs and appeals, (ii) it insertrd the words "or shall be continued in such Courts as the case may be" in the proviso, and (iii) it ddeted the word "thereupon'' from the proviso. The object of amendments made at (ii) aod (iii) was to remove the judicial confusion caused by Courts takin~ conflicting views on
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