MOTILAL JAIN versus SMT. RAMDASI DEVI AND ORS.
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MOTILAL JAIN v. SMT. RAMDAS[ DEVI AND ORS. JULY 20, 2000 [SYED SHAH MOMAMMED QUADRI AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.) Specific Reliefs Act, 1963: Sections 9, 16 (c) and Section 21-Agreement A B to sell entered between the plaintiff and the defendant-Two-third payment C made at the time of entering into the agreement-Balance one-third to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed-Defendant avoided acceptance of balance payment and execution of sale deed-Plaintiff sent three legal notices followed by a suit for specific performance and compensation in the alternative-Suit decreed for specific performance in favour of the p/aintifJ- ln appeal, High Court set aside the decree for specific relief granting a D decree for compensation on the ground of delay in filing the suit; lack of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the contract and claim of compensation in the alternative-On appeal, Held: Ground of delay cannot be invoked as the last legal notice was sent to the defendant after around 21 months and suit was filed after 9 months only i.e. not more than a year- Averment of readiness and willingness in the plaint is not a mathematical E formula and need not be in specific words-Paras 6 and 11 of the plaint clearly indicated readiness and willingness of the plaintiff-Plaintiffs having parted with two-thirds of the consideration is evident of the fact that he would part with the balance one-third also-Mere claim of damages in alternative cannot bar the main relief F In 1977, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to purchase the suit property for a sum of Rs. 25,000. The plaintiff paid Rs. 17,000 to the defendant vendor at the time of the execution of the contract i.e. in the month of February, 1977 whereas the balance amount of Rs. 8,000 was to be paid within next ftve months i.e. at the time of execution of the sale deed. G When the defendant evaded receiving the balance amount of Rs. 8,000 and execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff sent three notices to the defendant through his Advocate in the month of March, April and November, 1978. Later the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance against the defendant and in the alternative claimed Rs. 38,000 as damages. The defendant denied H 615 616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R. A execution of the agreement to sell altogether including his signature on it and receipt of Rs. 17,000 as part-consideration. Trial court decreed the suit for specific performance holding that the defendant had executed the contract. In appeal, High Court confirmed the finding of the trial court as to the execution of the contract but set aside the relief of specific performance B granting a decree for compensation in the sum of Rs. 22,094. It held that the suit was filed two years after the accrual of cause of action and after about a year of sending of last legal notice; readiness and willingness of the plaintiff could not be inferred from the plaint and even assuming that the readiness and willingness was there, there was no evidence to prove such readiness and willingness. Hence, this appeal. c The appellant contended that there was no delay justifying denial of the relief of specific performance; there were averments in the plaint showing readiness and willingness and that under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act the plaint need not be in Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix A to Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent contended that para Nos. 6 & 11 of the plaint did D not conform to Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule to the CPC; and that the trial court ought to have framed an issue regarding readiness and wiilingness of the appellant. Allowing the appea~ the Court E HELD: I. The following aspects of delay are relevant in a case of specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property : (i) Delay running beyond the period prescribed under the Limitation Act; (ii) Delay in cases where though the suit is within the period of limitation, yet : (a) due to delay the third parties have acquirยทed rights in the subject matter of the suit; (b) in the facts and circumstances of the case, delay may give rise to plea of waiver F or otherwise it will be inequitable to grant a discretionary relief. Here none of the above mentioned aspects applies. That apart factually also, the High Court proceeded on an incorrect assumption with regard to cause of action. The agreement t
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