MONGIBAI HARIRAM versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
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MONGIBAI HARIRAM A v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER October 25, 1965 [A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J • B • Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rrttes Control Act (57 of 1947), ss. 13 and 17-Bombay Land Requisition Act (33 of 1948), ss. 4(3) and 6--Room in a building-If "Premises"-Eviction of tenant on ground of landlord's bona fide requirement-If premises could be requisi- • tioned. P, the tenant of a room, in a block of buildings owned by a trust of c which the appellants were trustees, left the room without informing the appellants and leaving K in occupation thereof. The appellants never recognised K as a tenant. No rent was paid from !st January 1956. The appellants gave the tenant P a notice to quit and thereafter filed a suit against P and K for recovery of possession of the room under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 on three grounds-, namely, sub-letting "'·ithout permission, non·payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the room for their own use and ]) , occupation. Evidence \Vas led on the second and iast grounds. An ex parte decree in ejectment was passed and on 3()th April 1959, the appel- !ants obtained possession. On !st May 1959, K wrote to the Accommo- dation Control1er that he was evicted and rend·cred homeless, and the Controller on September 10, 1959 passed two separate orders under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, requisitioning the room by one, and allotting the room to K by tho other. The appellants ·moved the E High Court under Art. 226 for quashing these orders but were unsuc- cessful. In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellants that : (i) Since the appellants obtained an ejectment decree on the ground that • they wanted the room for their own use and they did not intend to let it out at the time of requisition, the room would not be 'premises• under s. 4(3) of the Act of 1948 which could be requisitioned; and (ii) the order of requisition was passed niala fide. F HELD : (i) (By Full Court) : The room was 'premises' within the definition of that word in the Act of 1948 and could be requisitioned. [327 H; 338 Fl Per Sarkar J : The expression "let or intended to be let separately" in the definition of premises in the Act of 1948 is only apolicab1e to a part of a building for there is no question of a whole building being let separately. The words "intended to be let" in this definition do not • refer to any intention to let, actually existing at the time of the requisi· G tion; they have been used to indicate that a part of a building which had never been let before would not be "premises" within the Act unless the lessor had intended to let it separately. If it is proved that the landlord • had at any time let or intended to Jct a part of a building separately, it would for all time to come be 'premises' within the Act of 1948. [326 H· J 3n~m ' Per Raghubar Dayal and Ramaswami, JJ : The words 'let or intend· H ed to be let separately' can apply only to the letting of a part of building, as nght1y, a landlord of a building is not to be forced to let a part of the building when he is in occupation of it. Therefore, from the date of the MONGIBAI V. STATE 323 A enforcement of the Requisition Act, every building comes within the ex- pression "p'remises" and a part of a building comes within the expression, if it is Jet or if it is intended to be let separately on that date. It would be impracticable to decide every time a part of a building fell vacant, whether the landlord intends or does not intend to Jet it. [337 G-H; 338 B, E] (ii) Per Raghubar Dayal and Ramaswami, JJ. : The facts that the B allottee had not paid rent previously to the appellants, took various steps to delay the execution of the decree for ejectment and applied to the Accommodation Controller for allotment to himself on the day following the ejectment, do not, in law, make the· requisition order niala fide, when the order was not. made on account of any animus against the appellants ..._ or for a purpose for which requisition could not be made. [339 F-H] c D E F G , --?" H Requisitioning of premises for allotment to a person \vho is homeless is requisitioning for a public purpose. The allotment to a person who was a tenant of the premises and who remiss in his duties as a tenant and had been evicted in execution of a decree of a court, in pursuance
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