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MONGIBAI HARIRAM versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1966] 2 S.C.R. 322 · Decided: 25-10-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

MONGIBAI HARIRAM 
A 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER 
October 25, 1965 
[A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J 
• 
B 
• 
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rrttes Control Act (57 of 
1947), ss. 13 and 17-Bombay Land Requisition Act (33 of 1948), ss. 
4(3) and 6--Room in a building-If "Premises"-Eviction of tenant on 
ground of landlord's bona fide requirement-If premises could be requisi-
•
tioned. 
P, the tenant of a room, in a block of buildings owned by a trust of c 
which the appellants were trustees, left the room without informing the 
appellants and leaving K in occupation thereof. The appellants never 
recognised K as a tenant. No rent was paid from !st January 1956. 
The appellants gave the tenant P a notice to quit and thereafter filed 
a suit against P and K for recovery of possession of the room under the 
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 
on three grounds-, namely, sub-letting "'·ithout permission, non·payment 
of rent and bona fide requirement of the room for their own use and 
]) 
, 
occupation. 
Evidence \Vas led on the second and iast grounds. 
An ex 
parte decree in ejectment was passed and on 3()th April 1959, the appel-
!ants obtained possession. 
On !st May 1959, K wrote to the Accommo-
dation Control1er that he was 
evicted and rend·cred homeless, and the 
Controller on September 10, 1959 passed two separate orders under the 
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, requisitioning the room by one, 
and allotting the room to K by tho other. 
The appellants ·moved the 
E 
High Court under Art. 226 for quashing these orders but were unsuc-
cessful. 
In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellants that : (i) 
Since the appellants obtained an ejectment decree on the ground that 
•
they wanted the room for their own use and they did not intend to let 
it out at the time of requisition, the room would not be 'premises• under 
s. 4(3) of the Act of 1948 which could be requisitioned; and (ii) the 
order of requisition was passed niala fide. 
F 
HELD : (i) (By Full Court) : The room was 'premises' within the 
definition of that word in the Act of 1948 and could be requisitioned. [327 
H; 338 Fl 
Per Sarkar J : The expression "let or intended to be let separately" 
in the definition of premises in the Act of 1948 is only apolicab1e to a 
part of a building for there is no question of a whole building being let 
separately. The words "intended 
to be let" in this definition do not 
• 
refer to any intention to let, actually existing at the time of the requisi· 
G 
tion; they have been used to indicate that a part of a building which had 
never been let before would not be "premises" within the Act unless the 
lessor had intended to let it separately. If it is proved that the landlord 
• 
had at any time let or intended to Jct a part of a building separately, it 
would for all time to come be 'premises' within the Act of 1948. [326 H· 
J
3n~m 
' 
Per Raghubar Dayal and Ramaswami, JJ : The words 'let or intend· 
H 
ed to be let separately' can apply only to the letting of a part of building, 
as nght1y, a landlord of a building is not to be forced to let a part of the 
building when he is in occupation of it. Therefore, from the date of the 
MONGIBAI V. STATE 
323 
A 
enforcement of the Requisition Act, every building comes within the ex-
pression "p'remises" and a part of a building comes within the expression, 
if it is Jet or if it is intended to be let separately on that date. It would 
be impracticable to decide every time a part of a building 
fell vacant, 
whether the landlord 
intends or does not intend to Jet it. [337 G-H; 
338 B, E] 
(ii) Per Raghubar Dayal and Ramaswami, JJ. : The facts that the 
B 
allottee had not paid rent previously to the appellants, took various steps 
to delay the execution of the decree for ejectment 
and applied to the 
Accommodation Controller for allotment to himself on the day following 
the ejectment, do not, in law, make the· requisition order niala fide, when 
the order was not. made on account of any animus against the appellants 
..._ 
or for a purpose for which requisition could not be made. [339 F-H] 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
, 
--?" 
H 
Requisitioning of premises for allotment to a person \vho is homeless 
is requisitioning for a public purpose. The allotment to a person who 
was a tenant of the premises and who remiss 
in his duties as a tenant 
and had been evicted in execution of a decree of a court, in pursuance

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