MOHMED INAYATULLAH versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1976] 1 S.C.R. 715 · Decided: 09-09-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.N. BHAGWATI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 12 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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MOHMEDINAYATULLAH 
r 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
September 9, 1975 
[P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] 
L\iJence Act (l of 1872), s. 27-Scopc of-S. 114(a)--Scope of. 
715 
The appellant was charged with an offence of theft of three- drums 
of 
chemiQa1s. 
He was taken into police custody. 
On interrogation he said: 
"! wiU tell ~he place of deposit of the three chemical drums V.'hich I took 
out. ....... . 
The. drun1s were thereafter recovered fron1 the place mentioned by him. 
The trial court held that the. information given by the appellant as a result 
of which the stolen drums were discovered, was admissible und~r s. 27 of 
the Evidence Act and that under illustration (a) to s. 114 Evidence Act, 
the appellant would be presumed to be the thief. 
A11owing the appeal to this Court, 
HELD : 1 (a) The conditions necessary for bringing this section into opera: 
tion; are (i) the discovery of a. fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the 
information received fr9m a person accused of an offence (ii) the discovery 
of such fact must be deposed to, (iii) at the timoe. of the receipt of the 
information the .accused must be in police custody, and (iv) only "so much 
of the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered 
is 
ad1ni..>sible. 
The rest of the information has to be excluded. 
[718 F,) 
(b) The word 'distinctly' means 'directly', 'indubitably'_ 'strictly', 'unmis. 
1akably. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of 
the proveable information. Tll\': phrase "distinctly relates to the fact thereby 
discovered" refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which 
is the di 1·ect and flnn1ediate cause of the discovery. [718 F] 
(c) If a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given 
by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part 
OAly, of the inforn1aion which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause 
of the discovery. 
No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the 
statement which tnay be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. 
[718 GJ 
Palukuri' Kotayya and ors. v. En1peror 74 I.A. 65 and Udai Bhan v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 830, referred to. 
ln lhe instant case only the first part of the statement, namely "I will tell 
the place of deposit of the three chemical drums'' was the immediate and 
direct cau~~ of the· fact discovered. 
Therefore. this portion only was admissible 
under s. 27. 
The rest of the statemient was not a distinct and a proximate 
cac1se vf the discovery and had to be ruled out evidence altogether. [719 G] 
2(..t) ft cannot be said that the admissible portion of the information taken 
in conjllnction with the facts discovered was sufficient to draw the presump. ion 
that the 
accu~ed was the thief Or receiver of stolen property knowin!' it to be 
stolen. The drums were in a Musafirkhana which was a place accessible to 
all and sundry. 
The drums were not alleged to be lying concealed nor was 
the compound under 1he lock and key of the appellant. [720 Ai-B] 
(b) The inference under s. 114{a) can never be reached unJcss it is a 
necessary inference from the circumstances of a given case \Vhich could not 
be explained on any other hypothesis save that of the guilt of th~ accused. In 
the present case two alternative hypotheses are equally possible ( i) that it was 
the accused who had hin1self deposited the stolen drums in the J\.fusaffrkhana 
716 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1976] I S.C.R. 
or (ii) the accused only knew that the drums were lying at that place. The 
second hypothesis was compatible. with the innocence of the accused and be 
is entitled to the benefit of doubt. [720 C-D] 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 131 
of 1971. 
A 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order date(! the 
B 
,. 
4th March. 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 
1954 of 1969. 
' 
K. R- Chaudhury, S. L. Setia, Rajendra Chaudhury and Veena 
Khanna, for the appellant. 
H. R. Khanna and, M. N. Shroff, for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a 
judgment of the High Court of Bombay upholding the conviction anl:I 
sentience passed against the appellant under s. 379, Penal Code. The 
facts are these ; 
The appellant was tried in the court of the Presidency Magistrate 
5th Court, Dadar o

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