MOHINDER PAL JOLLY versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1979] 2 S.C.R. 805 · Decided: 14-12-1978 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.L. UNTWALIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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805 
MOHINDER PAL JOLLY 
A 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
December 14, 1978 
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
B 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860) Ss. 99, IOI, 103, 302, 303 and 
304. 
Factory owner fired from revolver on workers agitating for ·wages outside 
factory-Death of a worker-Accused claiming right of private defence of pro-
perty and person-Right when available-Accused if should be convicted and 
sentenced under Part-II of. Section 304 and not Part-l. 
There was h dispute between the appellant, a factory owner and his em-
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ployees in regard to wages, during the period of their lay-off. 
The prosecution alleged that on the day of th~ occurrence when the workers 
gathered outside the factory and raised innocuous slogans 
demanding 
their 
wages, the appellant came out and fired a .shot from his revolver, which hit a 
worker resulting in his death. 
The ::ippellant on the other hand alleged that a large number of labourers 
who collected outside the factory, shouted very abusive slogans, threatening that 
they would not k.ave him alive and showered brickbats at the factory premises 
causing damage to the appellant's property. 
Apprehending im1n1nent danger 
to his life and property, his driver fired a shot from the revolver which 
resulted in the death of the deceased. 
The trial court, with whose findings the High Court agreed, found that the 
\\'orkers might hav" hurled brickbats into the factory premises; but they did not 
break the barbed wire on the boundary wall nor did they try to scale 
the 
boundary wall. that they did not carry any sticks, that no brickbats hurled by 
the workers could enter the appellant's office and therefore his version that 
some brickb:its damaged the glass on his office table was incorrect and that it 
was the appellant and not his driver that fired his revolver which resulted in the 
death of the Otceased. The High Court, agreeing with the trial court, held that 
though the appellant had the right of private defence of property it did not go 
to the extent of causing death and, therefore, he exceeded his right of private 
defence. Holding that the offence fell under Exception 2 to s. 
300 IPC the 
High Court convicted him under s. 304, Part-I. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the aPpeiiarit that in 
the exercise of his right of private defence the appellant was entitled to and 
justified in la\1.' in using force even to the extent of causing death ilthough he 
never intended to kill the deceased or anyone. 
On the facts and circtimstances 
of the case, it did not come \Vithin clause 4thly of s. 300; or even if it fell with-
in that provision, on the application of exception 2, he could only be convicted 
under Part II of s. 304 and not under Part I. 
Even if his conviction 
were 
maintained, imposition of ti.he would meet the ends of justice. 
Dismissing the appeal in part, 
HELD : The appellant could be convicted only under Part-II of s. 304 and 
not Part-I. [813 CJ. 
13-4~ SCl/79 
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806 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ 1979] 2 S.C.R. 
(I) The High Court was right in not finding the appellant guilty of having 
committed culpable homicide amounting to murder wjthin 
clauses 
Firstly, 
Secondly or Thirdly and finding him guilty with the aid of clau':ie 4thly \vhere 
the intention to cause murder is absent but "the person committing the act 
knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause 
death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death". The clause further 
aays that the person "commits such act without any excuse for incurring the 
risk of causing death or 5UCh injury as aforesaid." 
The appellant must have 
committed the act with the knowledge that it was imminently dangerous and in 
all probability must cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause 
death. 
Dehors Exception 2, he had no excuse for committing the said ai:t. 
[813 D-El 
In the present case the workers' demand for wages was not legal. 
The 
workers raised provocative 
~logans and did throw brickbats damaging the 
appellant's property and endangering it to further damage. 
But !.hat by it~elf 
could not give any right of private defence of person to the appellant. There 
is no cvidt:nce to show that the workers had broken the barbed wire or that 
iome of them tried to scale the boundary wall. It may well be that some of 
them tried to raise their heads above the boundary wall. 
The

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