MOHD. FARUK versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS

Citation: [1970] 1 S.C.R. 156 · Decided: 01-04-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HIDAYATULLAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Cited by 12 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace
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Judgment (excerpt)

!Sb 
MOHD. FARUK 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS 
April I, 1969 
A 
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., 
J. C. SHAH, 
V. RAMASWAMI, 
B 
G, K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER,JJ.J 
Constitution of India-Article 19(1)(8)-Notification by Stale having 
eflect of banning 1/aughttr of bull, and bullDch-lf violativ• of the fu11-
t/<1mentaJ right under Art. 19(1) (1)-Princip/u for consid•rin1 cons1itu-
11c1nalily of law rutricting or prohibiting carrying on a bus/nus. 
Certain bye.laws framed by the Jabalpuf Municipality, which permitted 
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the slaughter of various animals including bulls and bullocks, were confirmed 
by the respondent State Government in 1948. By a DOtification on January 
12, 1967, in exercise of its powers under s. 430 of Madhya Pradesh Muni-
cipal Corporation Act 23 of 1956, the State Government cancelled tbc 
eonfirmalion of certain bye-laws "insofar as the bye-laws relate 
to the 
slaughter of bulls and bullocks". 
The petitioner challenged the constitu-
tionality of the notification by a writ petition under Art. 32 on the ground 
that it infringed his fundamental riaht under Art, 19(1)(g) of the Comti-
D 
tution. 
It was contended on behalf of the respondent Stale that (I) its power 
to rescind confirmation of the bye-laws could not be challenged by reference 
to An. 14 or Art. 19 of the Constitution, because the power vested in the 
Government to conJlrm the bye-laws carried with it the power to reecind 
such confirmation; and (2) that since every person 
desiring to use a 
slaughter house had to apply for and obtain a liocnce, which may be re-
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fuaed, and if given was liable to be withdrawn, no person may insist that 
he shall be aivcn a licence to slaughter animals in a slauabter-house. 
HELD : Allowing the petition, 
The impugned notification, though technically within the competence 
of the State Government, directly infringed the fundamental right of the 
petitioner guaranteed by Art 19(1)(g). It could be upheld only if it wu 
established that it sought to impooe reasonable restrictions in the interests 
f 
of the general public and a less drastic re&triction would not ensure the 
interest of the general public. (161 DJ 
· 
The sentiments of a oection of the people may be hun by permittini 
slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a local authority. 
But a prohibition imposed on the eaercise of a fundamental right to cany 
on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reuonablc, if 
it is imposed not in the interest of the general public. but merely tv respect· 
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the maceplibilitie• and sentiments of a oection of the people whose way of 
life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant. [161 HJ 
The power to i5'ue bye-laws indis!>u.tably in~ludcs t!'e power to cancel 
or withdraw the bye-Jaws, but the val1d1ty of tbe exerc11C pf the power to 
i.sue and to cancel or withdraw the bye-laws must be adjudged in. the light 
of its impact upon the fundamental rights of persons atl'ected thereby. 
When the validity of a law placing restriction upon the exercise of funda-
H 
mental rights in Art. 19(1) i• challenged, the onus of proving to the satis-
faction of the Court that the restriction is reaS\Jnable lies upon the State. 
A lalh· requiring that an act which i5 inhcrcnlly d:in~rous, nox.iou!I or 
A 
B 
c 
MOHD. FARUK v. M. P. STATE (Shah, J.) 
157 
injurious to. public interest; health or safety or is likely to pr9ve a nuisaJ?CC 
to the community, shall be done under a permit or licence of an executive 
authbrity, is not per se unreasonable and no person. may claim a licence or 
permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a 
licence or a permit confers a discretion upon an. administrative authority 
regulated by rules oi principles expressed or implied, and excersiable 
in 
consonance with rules of natural justice, it will be presumed to impose a 
reasonable restriction. 
Where, however, power is entrusted to an adminis~ 
trative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled 
discretion, the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Art. 
19(1). [160 Fl 
Mohd. Hanlf Quareshi and Others v. The St.ate of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 
629; Abdul Hakim Quraishi and Others v. The State of Blhar, [1961] 2 
S.C.R. 610; and Narendra Kumar and Others v. The Union vf India and 
Othtr!, [1960) 2 S.C.R. 375; referred to. 
O!lIGINAL JUll1so1cTION: Writ Petition No. 60 of 1969. 
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
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