LexMOHANLAL NANABHAI CHOKSI (DEAD) BY LRS. versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
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[2010] 12 S.C.R. 499 MOHANLAL NANABHAI CHOKSI (DEAD) BY LRS. V. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 7268 of 2004) OCTOBER 04, 2010 [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.] Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963: A B Acquisition proceedings initiated by State Government to establish a vegetable market under Bombay Provincial C Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Held: The land owner is entitled to raise the question of non-applicability of the 1949 Act, in view of a specific later legislative enactment i.e. 1963 Act - Matter remitted to High court for consideration afresh in the light of questions formulated - Land Acquisition Act, D 1894 - Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - s.78. Constitution of ln.dia, 1950: Article 300A - Right to property - Deprivation of property by acquisition - Held: Right E to property may no longer be a fundamental right, but it enjoys the protection of Article 300A to the extent that there can be no deprivation of property save by valid authority of law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Bombay Provincial MuniCipal Corporations Act, 1949 - s. 78 - Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963. F The question which arose for consideration in the instant appeal was whether the State Government could initiate tho acquisition proceedings to establish a vegetable market on the basis of resolution of Surat G Municipal Corporation (SMC) under Section '78 of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 -in view of a specific later legislative enactment i.e. the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963. · 499 I H I 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R. A Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High Court, the Court HELD: 1. Under Chapter IX and Section 49 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963, the State Government is authorized to acquire any land within a 8 market area, if it is needed for the purposes of the Act, i.e. the 1963 Act. Such acquisition can be made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force. Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC) passed the resolution C relying on Section 78 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (BPMC Act) for initiating its proposal of acquisition of land for the establishment of a vegetable market. Since the property of the appellants was taken away as a result of the acquisition D proceedings, the appellants were entitled to raise the question of non-applicability of the BPMC Act to initiate the acquisition proceedings for establishing a vegetable market, in view of the clear provisions of the 1963 Act, which is a special and a later Act. [Paras 14, 23, 30] [506- E F] [510-F] [512-G-H] 2. The right of property, may no longer be a fundamental right, but it enjoys the protection of Article 300A of the Constitution to the extent that there can be no deprivation of property save by authority of law. F Authority of law would obviously mean valid authority of law. In a case of deprivation of property by acquisition, ultimately by Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is a cfrastic and expropriatory piece of legislation, the owners of property, the appellants were, admittedly, entitled to G raise all legally permissible objections to the legality of an acquisition proceeding. The High Court proceeded on an erroneous approach as it refused to examine the validity of the main challenge raised by the appellants on a ground of their lack of locus. The approach of the High Court goes H to the root of the issue and makes its judgment very MOHANLAL NANABHAI CHOKSI (DEAD) BY LRS. v. 501 ' STATE OF GUJARAT • vulnerable. Thus, the impugned judgment of the High A Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to it for decision afresh on all issues but specifically on two questions formulated as under: (i) Whether the 1963 Act, a later and a special Act as B compared to the 1949 Act would prevail over the 1949 Act or whether a harmonious construction is possible between the 1963 Act and the 1949 Act on the footing'that they seem to govern two distinct and separate spheres of inarkets. c (ii) Section 78 peculiarly uses the term "property vested in the corporation". A plain reading ofthe term seem to prima facie imply that the SMC can only acquire property vested in it and not private property. Thus, High Court may decide the scope and ext
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