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MOHANLAL CHUNILAL KOTHARI versus TRIBHOVAN HARIBHAI TAMBOLI

Citation: [1963] 2 S.C.R. 707 · Decided: 02-05-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 7 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

r 
~ 
' 
2 S.C.R, 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
707 
' 
We are therefore of opinion that the finding 
1' of the High Court that the loss took place due to 
the negligence of the railway servants and, conse-
q11ently, of the railway administration, is justified. 
We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. 
Appeal dismissed. 
MOHANLAL CHUNILALKOTHARI 
TRIBHOVAN HARIBHAI TAMBOLI 
(B. p. SINHA, c. J.; P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. 
WANCHOO, N. RAJA'.GOPALA AYYANGAR and 
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) 
Suit-Decree-Law changed during pendency of apP<al-
·i Appdlate Oourt, if bound to apply changed law-Rettospecti•• 
) operation-Bombay 
Tenancy 
and 
Agricultural 
Lands 
Act (Bom. LXVI of 1948, •· 88 (l)(d)-Bombay Tenancy Ace, 
W~&UW. 
. 
. 
Certain )ands were situated in the erstwhile State of 
Baroda before it became a part of the State of Bombay by mer-
ger. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, 
was extended to Baroda on August I, 1949. Suits were filed in 
the Civil Court by appellants-landlords against the respond-
ents who were their tenants on the ground that the latter 
became trespassers with effect from the beginning of the new 
/ agricultural season in May, 1951. . Decrees for possession 
were passed by the Civil Court in favour of landlords and the 
same were confirmed by the first appellate court. 
Ho\vever, 
the High Court accepted the appeals and dismissed the suito. 
It was held that under the provisions of s. 3A( 1) of the Born· 
bay Tenancy Act, 1939, as amended, a tenant would be 
deemed to be a protected tenant from August.I, 195() and ihat 
vested right. could not be affected by the notificaiion dated 
¥ April 24,.1951 issued under s. 89 (I) (d) of the Act of 1948 by 
,- which the land in suit was exclud_ed from the operation of 
the Act. 
The notification 
dated April 24, 1951 had no 
rc,trospective effect and did not take away the protection_ 
J96Z 
-~ 
Union qf Ind/• 
y, 
M/s. Udho Ram 
&1 Sorn 
RavAubar D•J•I J. 
1962 
Moy2. 
Moltwtlal Clu111llol 
40C/Jcri 
•• 
Tril>Aoo.,,. H ribl<Oi 
l'.mboli 
708 
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] 
afforded to tenants by s. 3A. 
The landlords came to this 
., 
Court by spedal leave. It was conceded that the appellants' 
suits for possession would fail if the Act applied to the ten· 
ancies in question, because in that c:1se only revenue courts 
had jurisdiction to try them. 
However, reliance was plated 
on notification dated April 24, 1951 which excluded the land in 
suit from the operation of the Act. 
It was also contended on 
behalf of appellants that the subsequent notification cancelling 
the first one, could not take away the rights which had 
accrued to them as a result of the first notification. 
Held, that the notification dated April 24, 1!151 was 
~ 
cancelled by another notification dated January 12, 1953. 
The second notification was issued when the matter was still 
pending in the first court of appeal. The suits had therefore 
to be decided on the basis that there was no notification in 
existence which would take the disputed lands out of the 
operation of the Act. The first appellate court was wrong in 
holding that the suits had to be decided on the basis of facts 
in existence on the date of filing of the suits. 
Held, further, that the second ,;otification cancelling the 
first one did not take away any rights which had accrued to 
the landlords. If the landlords had obtained an effective 
decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result • 
of that decree which may have become final between the 
parties, that decree may not have been re-opened and the 
execution taken thereunder may not have been recalled. 
However, it was during the pendency of the suit at the ap· 
pellate stage that the second notification was issued cancel-
ling the first a.nd the r.ourt was bound to apply the law as it 
was on the date of its judgment. 
HeW., also, that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 88(1) 
applied to things as they were on the date of the commence-
ment of the Act of 194-8 whereas clause (d) authorised the 
State Government to specify certain areas as being reserved 
for urban non~agricultural or industrial 
development, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time. It was 
specifically provided in clauses (a) to (c) that the Act, from 
its inception, did not apply to certain areas then identified, 
whereas clause ( d) had reference to the future. The State 
Government could take out of the operation of the Act such 
areas as

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