MOHAN RAWALE versus DAMODAR TATYABA@ DADASAHEB AND ORS.

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 850 · Decided: 06-08-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, P.B. SAWANT · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
MOHAN RAWALE 
v. 
DAMODAR TJ\TYABA@ DADA.SAHEB AND ORS. 
AUGUST 6, 1992 
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.J 
Representation of People Act, 1951: Sections 123(2)(3) and 3A-£/ec-
tion Petition-Corrupt practice-A/legations pertaining to the period prior to 
nomination-R.e/evance of. 
· 
Sections 81, 83 and 86-Election Petition-Proceedings-'Disc/osing a 
reasonable cause of action '-What is-Distinction between 'material facts' 
and 'full particulars'-What i.;. 
Election Petition-Non supply of Annexures-Effect of-Contents set 
D out in petition but not· served on respondent-Petition whether should be 
dismissed . . 
E 
F 
Section 79(b )-Expression 'candidate'-Substitution of by Act 40 of 
197o-Effect of. 
The respondent, who was defeated at the elections to the 10th Lok 
Sabha from the Bombay South Central Parliamentary Constituency, filed 
an election petition challenging the election of the appellant, the returned 
candidate alleging corrupt practices under Sections 123(2)(3) and 3(A) of 
the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant took out chamber 
summons for an order of dismissal of the Election Petition contending that 
the memorandum of petition did not disclose a cause of action; that copies 
of annexures were not supplied; and that the pleadings were friv!>lous and 
vexatious but the High Court dismissed the motion. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant 
G that: (i) In view of the substituted definition of the expression 'candidate' 
in section 79(b), the appellant acquired the status of a candidate only from 
the date of filing of nomination; since the allegations of corrupt practices 
related to a period prior to the nomination i.e. prior to the appellant 
becoming a candidate they would not amount to corrupt practice even if 
H they are proved; (ii) The allegations in the election petition relating to the 
850' 
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 
851 
period after the commencement of the appellant's candidature are vague, A 
bereft of material particulars, frivolous and vexatious and do not disclose 
a reasonable cause of action; and (iii) the copies of certain documents 
which were an integral part of the proceedings were not supplied. 
Disposing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. The allegations of corrupt practice relating to the period 
anterior to the commencement of the candidature cannot be relied. upon 
B 
to establish corrupt practice proprio vigore. The view taken by the High 
Court fails to take note of and give effect to the substitution of the 
definition of the expression 'candidate' in section 79(b). All sub-sections C 
of section 123 of the Act refer to the acts of a 'candidate' or his election 
agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election 
agent. The substituted definition completely excludes the acts by a can-
didate upto the date he is nominated as a candidate. (856-C, 855-E] 
2.1. The High Court was right in its view that there was a triable D 
issue arising out of the pleadings. An election petition can be rejected 
under Order VII Rule 11 (a) C.P.C. if it does not disclose a cause of action. 
Pleadings could also be struck out under Order VI Rule 16, inter alia, if 
they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. A reasonable cause of action 
is said to mean a cause of action with some chance of success when only 
- the allegations in the pleading are considered. But so long as the claim E 
discloses s_ome cause of action or raises some question fit to be decided by 
a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no 
-ground for striking it out. The· implications of the liability of the pleadings 
to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of 
action are quite often more known than clearly understood. It does intro-
F 
duce another special demurer in a new shape. [859 D-E, 856 G-H, 857-A] 
2.2. The failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of 
action is distinct from the absence of'full particulars. There is a distinction 
amongst the 'grounds' in Section 8l(l):the 'material facts' in Section 
83(l)(a) and 'full particulars' in Section 83(1)(b). Further, the distinction G 
between "material facts" and "full particulars" is one of degree. The lines 
of distinction are not sharp. "Material facts" are those which a party relies 
upon and which, if he does not prove, he fails at the time. The distinction 
between 'material facts' and 'particulars' which togeth

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