MIS. AMBALAL SARABHAI ENTERPRISES LTD. versus MIS. AMRIT LAL AND CO. AND ANR.

Citation: [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 195 · Decided: 27-08-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AJAY PRAKASH MISRA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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MIS. AMBALAL SARABHAI ENTERPRISES LTD. 
A 
V. 
MIS. AMRIT LAL AND CO. AND ANR. 
AUGUST 27, 2001 
[A.P. MISRA AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.] 
B 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Sections 3(c) and 14(1) (b). 
Rent Control-Eviction proceedings-Section 3(c) coming into force 
during pendency of proceedings-Effect of-Held Section 6 of the General C 
Clauses Act was applicable-Held pending proceedings before Rent Controller 
were not affected 
General Clauses Act, 1897 : 
Section 6-Scope and applicability of 
D 
The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant-
tenant on the ground of sub-letting under section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent 
Control Act, 1958. During the pendency of this petition section 3(c) was 
incorporated in the Act by Amendment which become effective rro·m 
1.12.1998. This section excluded the Jurisdiction of Rent Controller with E 
respect to those tenancies whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3500. The question 
for consideration is : what is the effect of this amendment on the pending 
eviction proceedings. The appellant-tenant contended that it is the Civil Court 
alone which has the Jurisdiction after the aforesaid amendment and not the 
Rent Controller, while respondent-landlord submitted that notwithstanding F 
the aforesaid amendment it is the Rent Controller who would have the 
Jurisdiction. From these submissions the following questions arose for 
consideration : 
(1) Whether the landlord and tenant are relegated to seek their rights 
and remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant G 
under rent control legislation is withdrawn through amendment ? 
(2) Can a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under proviso 
(b) to Section 14 of the said Act be claimed by a landlord as a vested right? 
(3) In case a protection given to a tenant under the Rent Act is said to H 
195 
196 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A be not a vested right and if that protection is withdrawn, can a landlord claim 
any ground of eviction under the Rent Act to be his vested rights ? 
Disposing the appeals, the Court 
HELD : I. A landlord or tenant is relegated t(/ seek his rights and 
B remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant under 
the Rent Act is withdrawn, except in cases where section 6 of the General 
Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable. [217-DI 
2. A ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under proviso (b) to 
section 14 of the Rent Act would not constitute to be a vested right of a 
C landlord, but it would be a right and privilege accrued within the meaning of 
section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act in a matter if proceeding for eviction 
is pending. 1217-E) 
3. When tenant has not vested right under a Rent Act having only 
protective right, withdrawal of such protection would not confer on a landlord 
D a vested right to evict a tenant under Rent Act except where sub-clause (c) of 
section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable. [217-F) 
4. As a general rule, in view of section 6 of the General clauses Act the 
repeal of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima 
E facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed 
enactment were still in force. Thus a pending proceeding before the Rent 
Controller for the eviction of a tenant on the date when the repealing Act 
came into force would not be affected by the repealing statute and will be 
continued and concluded in accordance with the law as existed under the 
repealed statute. Siu.ce proceeding for the eviction of the tenant was pending 
F when repealing Act came into operation, section 6 of the General Clauses Act 
would be applicable in the present case. Therefore, the Rent Controller has 
the Jurisdiction over the subject matter. [211-A; 217-C) 
5. When a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get 
crystalised on that date. The mandate of section 6 is simply to leave the 
G pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepeated 
provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. Clause ( c) of section 6, refers 
the words "any right, privilege, obligation ... acquired or accrued'' under the 
repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. However, mer.e 
existence of a right not being 'acquired' or 'accrued', on the date of the repeal 
H would not get protection of section 6. At the most such a provision can be 
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AMBALAL SARABHAI ENTERPRISES LTD. v. AMRIT LAL AND CO. 
J 

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