MERUGU SATYANARAYANA ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS

Citation: [1983] 1 S.C.R. 635 · Decided: 18-10-1982 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.A. DESAI · Disposal: Case Allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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MERUGU SATYANARAYANA ETC. ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS 
Octo.ber 18, 1982 
[D.A. DESAI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ,] 
National Security Act, 
/~BO-Section 3(2), scope of-Pas1ing a detention 
order under the Act, against persons who are under judicial custody and thereby 
lost their liberty, is bad in law-Writ of Habeas Corpus-The affidavit in opposition 
supporting the reply 10 show cause should be from the person who passed the 
detention order-The affidavit ·of a sub·inspector of police at whose instance the 
arrest was made cannot satisfy the conititutlon'al mandate· and· will be treated 01 
non-est-Detention in violation of-Assurance before the Supreme Court in tin earlier 
case, that the preventive detention would not be taken against political opponents, 
whether would amount to flagrant violation thereof. 
In both the Writ Petitions, when tlie petitioners were already in judicial 
custody and·. thus have been deprivCd of their liberty, the District Magistrate 
Adilab•ad passed the detentio~ orders in exercise of the power conferred under 
Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980. The 
detenu in each of these petitions filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
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Andbia Pradesh High Court and both the petitions were rejected. 
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In the present petitions, it was contended as follows : 
(i) that in both the cases, the detenus being in judicial custody were 
already prevented from pursuing any activity which may prove pre· 
judicial to th~ maintenance of public order and, therefore, no order 
of detention could be passed against each of them ; 
(ii) that the affidavit-in-opposition was filed by a sub-inspector of police 
and not by the detaining authority, i.e. the District Magistrate had 
completely abdiCated his powers ; and 
(iii) that in flagrant violation of the assurances given at the hearing of 
A.K. Roy's case, that the drastic and draconian power of preventive 
detention will not be exercised against political opponents, the 
affidavit in opposition would show that the power of preventive 
detention was exerc!sed against political opponents because the detenu 
in each case was a member 'and organizer of C.P.I. (M.L.) (Peoples 
War Group), a political party operating in this country. 
Allowing the petitions, .the Court 
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636 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
( 1983 J I s.c.R. 
HELD : 1 :I. A preventive action postulates that if preventive step Js 
not faken the person sought to be prevented may indulge into an activity pre-
judicial to the maintenance of public order. In other ·words, unless the activity 
is interdicted by a preventive detention order the activity which is being indulged 
into is likely to be repeated. That this is the postulate, indisputably transpires 
from the language einployed in Sub~section (2) of Section 3, which says that the 
detention order can be made with a view to preventing tho person sought to be 
detained from acting in any manner prejudiciai to the maintenance of public 
order. If it is shown that the man sought to be prevented by a preventive order 
is already effectively prevented, the power under sub-section (2) of Section 3, if 
exercised, would imply that one who is already preven1ed is sought to be further 
prevented which is not the mandate of the section, and would appear tauto.. 
logous. [640 F-H, 641-A] 
1:2. The detaining authority 'before exerc1s1ng the power of preventive 
detention would take into consideration the past conduct or antecedent history 
of the person and as a matter of faCt it is largCJy from the prior events showing 
the tendencies of a man that an inference could be dr8.wn whether he is likely 
even in th~ future to act iii a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public 
order. If the subjective satisfaction of the df:taioing authority. leads to this 
conclusion it can put an end to the activity· by making a preventive detention 
order., If the man is already detained a detaining authority cannot be said to have 
subjectively satisfi::d himself that a preventive detention order can be made. 
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[641 A-CJ 
Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, Jagir Singh v. State of Punjab "[1952] 
S.C.R. 756 and Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan and Anr. [1964]4 
$.C.R. 921.referred to. 
l :3. 
The 
subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority 
must 
coinprchend the very fact tha(tbe person 'iOught to be detained in jail is under 
detention and yet a

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