LexMEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB versus DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND OTHER
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6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ment prescribed by the proviso constitutes a condition precedent for the exercise of the authority conferred on the Income-tax Officer by s. 34(1A) and since that requirement is not shown to have been satisfied in his case, the appellant in C.A. No. 589 of 1963 must succeed even if s. 34(1A) is held 'to be valid. We are not impressed by this argument. What was urged before the High Court by the appellant was not that no reasons had been recorded by the Income-ta1 Officer as required by the proviso; the argument was that the appellant had not been given a copy of the said reasons and it appears to have been urged that the appellant wa' entitled to have such a copy. This latter part of the case has not been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad, and rightly. Now, when we look at the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that it was assumed by the appellant that reasons had been recorded and in fact, it was positively affirmed by the respondent that they had been so recorded; the controversy being, if the reasons are recorded, is the assessee entitled to have a copy of those reasons? Therefore, we do not sec how Mr. Setalvad can suggest that no reasons had in fact been recorded, and so, the condition rprecedent prescribed by the proviso had not been complied with. The result is, all the Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions in this group fail and are dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeals and Writ Petitioru diJmisud. MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB v. DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.) ~vacuee Property-Money deposited wlth an Indian by u ptr~on wi'lo migrated to Pakistan-Liability to pay that amount to tM Cllltl>' dia-Admlniltration of E•ocw• Pro~1f1 Act, 1950 (31 al 1951 J:., I. Railil ... C./.T. Gai•ndragodklir c. J. ltlH 1964 Jlnnon Abdul Llrim Y. D7· C111todl1111 General SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) ' 19SO) Amended 1. 48 (Act No. 91 of 19S6)-Limitation Act, 1908 (9 o/ 1908), Art. 60. Rupees 8S,OOO/· was deposited with the appellant by his sister in January 1946. The appellant's sister migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to August 1949. The Assistant Custodian called upon the appellant to pay this sum lying in deposit under s. 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The appellant pleaded that the amount could not be recovered from him because the money bad 1Jecn given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January 194S. The Assistant Custodian rejected the contention of the appellant and directed him to pay the amount under s. 48 of the Act, as it then stood. This· decision was affirmed . in appeal as well as in revision. Then the appellant moved a writ petition before the High ~ourt which was dismissed by the single Judge. On Latten Patev.t Appeal the High Court held that the amount was not recoverable under s. 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time. This decision was given oo December 9, ,1957, In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October', 22, 195'6. On January' 22, 1958 another notice of demand was sl:rved on the appellant by the Assistant Custodi•n, The Assistant Custpdian again directed the amount to be rccoyered. 1hc appc!Jaot preferrpd an appeal before 'the Custodian-General. 'The Custodian· General allowed the appeal and remanded the pro~eedings for further enquiry a.s directed by him. After the remand further evidence wa.t taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appellant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when th& property vested in the Custodian. Thereupon the appellant preferred an appeal to the Custodian-General and that appeal was di5missed. Then the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which wu sranted. Hence the appeal. H<ld: (i) Sub-ss. I and 2 of the amended '· 48 of the Administn>- tion of Evacuee Property Act are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. It is well-settled that procedural amendments to a Jaw apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may hav
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